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• 
WAR AS METAPHOR·AND·THE RULE. OF-LAW 
IN CRISIS: THE LESSONS WE SHOULD HAVE 
LE ED FROM THEW AR ON DRUGS 
Susan Stuart* 
• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent assassination attempt against Congresswoman Gabrielle 
Giffords1 and the murder of a federal judge prompted a corollary discussion 
about the manifestation of political rhetoric, a war of words about words. 
The discussion, which strayed from sincere concern to inexplicable illogic 
at times, posed the not-surprising question: Did the hyperbole of 
conservative politicians and pundits precipitate the attack?2 Given 
Loughner's mental instability, any direct link between specific exhortations 
0 
of politicians and pundits and his acts is highly problematic. However, we . 
cannot stop the discussion about the responsibility for Loughner's acts by 
ass"Qllling the intervening causation of his mental state cuts off 
responsibility, for doing so ignores the larger discussion about the use of 
militarized rhetoric and its effect on the behavior of others. Furthermore, 
that larger discussion must embrace what that rhetoric is doing· to this 
country's fundamental democratic principles, especially the rule of law . 
• 
Rhetoric has long been employed to persuade, even goad, people to 
. 
action. _Speakers use powerful words and images to persuade people to sell 
a product, to vote for a candidate, to encourage collective action, to 
propagandize a political message, or to follow a religious creed. Rhetoric is 
fundamental to the movement of people, to the indoctrination of the crowd. 
Powerful rhetoric indeed was required to persuade a reluctant and loosely 
affiliated group of colonists to rebel against the most powerful country on 
earth to fortn a union of states that would protect the right to engage in that 
rhetoric. However, the problem posed by much of today's rhetoric on 
both sides of the political spectrum although primarily on the right3 is that 
• 
1. 
2. 
Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A., DePauw University; M.Ed., Valparaiso 
University; J.D., Indiana University-Indianapolis. 
See, e.g., Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhom, In Attack's Wake, Political Repercussions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011., http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/0l/09/us/politicsl09giffords.html. 
See, e.g., Brian Montopoli & Robert Hendin, Sarah Palin Criticized over Gabrielle Giffords[1 
Presence on _.Target List," CBSNEWS, Jan. 8, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301· 
503544 162-20027918-503544.html. 
-
3. The current militarized rhetoric tends to originate from the right; the left uses it defensively: 
1 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.  
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• 
public policy discussions are no longer couched in the pragmatic rhetoric 
concerning the merits of ideas or solutions to problems facing the country. 
Instead, that rhetoric is couched in terms of war. 
. . 
Such militaristic rhetoric has become increasingly common in 
advancing public policy agendas, perhaps most notably evolving with Cold 
War rhetoric in foreign policy.4 More troubling has become the use of war 
rhetoric "to elicit public consent for all sorts of disparate ventures.''5 For 
instance, President ~yodon B. Johnson's War on Poverty was waged in the 
1960s to gain support for sweeping civil rights- refonns. The Cold War 
eventually resolved itself with the collapse of the· Soviet Union, while the 
War on Poverty effected significant civil rights legislation., Both so-called 
wars, not real wars but causes deemed to be just, were resolved favorably to 
the United States and thereby confirtned the efficacy of militaristic rhetoric. 
At the time, therefore, the use of such rhetoric seemed justified, not 
problematic. World War II was the very recent past, and we assumed the 
public understood the distinction between the rhetoric's metaphorical use in 
public policy positions and its literal use. We were, after all, still engaged 
in actual military operations in Korea and Vietnam during the 1950s and 
• 
1960s. We thought we recognized that militaristic rhetoric was a marketing 
ploy'(pathos) to sell the logic of foreign policy and of social policy (logos). 
Especially with regard to social policy, we recognized that the militarized 
rhetoric was a metaphor for the struggle with an. abstraction civil rights 
. 
and poverty. Although violence was an unfortunate outgrowth of the civil 
rights movement, Pres~dent Johnson's rhetoric was not a declaration of war 
against a literal enemy·. However, today's increasing use of militaristic 
rhetoric by politicians and pundits goes beyond its metaphorical use as a 
war against an abstraction. Instead, the use of such language is becoming 
• 
Americans tend to toss the_ word ''war" around carelessly[.) . . . [T]he term "cultural 
war'' was appropriated by neo-conservative intellectuals from the German tenn 
"Kulturkampf," which referred to Bismarck's campaign against the Roman Catholic 
Church in Germany in the 1870s and which suggests a Prussian harshness. Other parts 
of the social and political spectrum in the United States also use the tenn; at least in 
self-defense. 
James F. Childress, The War Metaphor in Public Policy: Some Moral Reflections, in DIE 
LEADER'S IMPERATIVE: ETHICS, INTEGRITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 181, 193 (J.C. Ficarotta ed., 
Purdue e.-Pubs 2.001), available at http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/press_ebooks/7. 
4. David Hoogland Noon, Operation Enduring Analogy: World War JL the War on Terror, and the 
Uses ofHistori.cal Memory, 7 RHETORIC & PuB. AFFAIRS 339, 342 (2004). "The swift transfer of 
military language (not to mention production) from World War II to the Cold War during the 
1940s represents only the most portentous example of the tendency for policymakers to imagine 
the nation in the midst of a perpetual war~" !d. 
5. /d. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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literal, and that rhetorical shift .matters. Today's militaristic rhetoric is 
increasingly identifying fellow citizens as enemies in a literal war. 
The homology of literal war rhetoric and metaphorical war rhetoric 
arises from a potent source. In the modern United States, military images 
have extraordinary persuasive value: 
• 
Collective memory of war, more than any other genre of historical 
experience, has been central to the public culture of the modem United 
States as well as to the commercial realm of historical memory. Popular 
memories of war not only claim to preserve some heroic moment of the 
past, but they often make acute demands upon the living, who must 
periodically show themselves worthy of the gifts bestowed upon them by 
the wartime sacrifices of others.6 
At some point, however, we have crossed the line from the . marketing use 
of the metaphorical militarization to actual militarization. Somewhere in 
• 
the last thirty or forty years, we have found it too· easy to use militarized 
rhetoric without examining its consequences. Nowhere is that easy usage 
more apparent than in the War on Drugs, especially as it relates to children . 
What happened to children in the War on Drugs may even be part of the 
reason why our current public discourse is reaching a crisis point: · A war 
against an abstraction found an enemy a defenseless enemy and 
fundamentally changed the ~le of law to make engaging that enemy much· 
• 
easter. 
At its inception, the War on Drugs had a public policy logos to market 
by its military pathos: The United States had a problem dealing with drug 
abuse when the War was declared. Hence, the War did not start as an end 
in and of itself. It was merely the means to curbing an abstract problem, 
not unlike the War on Poverty. Its militarized rhetoric did not start out as 
anything but a rhetorical ploy in changing public perception and therefore 
public policy. From the successes of that marketing strategy has emerged 
the new militarized rhetoric that has moved the metaphorical to the literaL 
Unfortunately, these renewed strategies seem utterly oblivious to the 
consequences of the abysmal failure that is the War on Drugs. 
Furthennore, the rhetoric of the War on Drugs has inured us to the moral 
implications of using such rhetoric and the personal responsibility that 
should go with it. Without that moral awareness, the new militarized 
rhetoric is much more dangerous as it becomes less metaphorical and more 
literal. 
Thus, the thesis of this article is that the larger marketing strategy of 
public policy through militarized rhetoric does have consequences because, 
• 
6. /d . 
• 
• 
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• 
. 
· . ultimately, a specific eneiny may be engaged and war-time exigencies may 
suspend the rule of law. Worse, we may have changed our schools into 
institutions where we teach children that militarized rhetoric is acceptable· 
and without moral consequence. Part I describes the militarization of the 
War on Drugs and how and why the U.S. goverrunent's marketing strategy 
was first employed. Turning schools into literal battlegrounds in the War 
on Drugs is the subject of Part II. That analysis will examine how all three 
• 
branches of government actually enabled the War on Drugs. by· both 
identifying children as enemies and legally justifying the war against them. 
Part III ·then explores the "Americanization" philosophy of the War, a 
philosophy that has not only contributed to the longevity of the War and 
turned public schoolchildren into the enemy but also acted as the 
abstraction that fonned the basis of today's militarized rhetoric in the 
Culture War by painting the War as an ''us-versus-them"-style struggle. 
Part IV then identifies the War on Drugs as one of the direct sources of 
today~s hyper-militarized rhetoric in which war is both the means and the 
end of the marketing strategy and opines that that War deafened Americans 
to the moral implications of war ~ metaphor so that we now do have actual 
war among citizens of this country, the consequence of which ·may be a 
fundamental change in the rule of la~. 
II. SOMETHING WICKED THIS WAY COMES7 
• • • 
The War on Drugs against children, teenagers in particular, has lasted 
longer than the reigns of the Roman Emperors Caligula through Nero. It 
did not start out as a war against teenagers, at least not explicitly. Rather, it 
started out as a way of scape-goating others for institutional failures and, 
ironically, as a backlash against President Johnson's War on Poverty and 
his civil rights successes in the 1960s. Nonetheless, teenagers got caught in 
• 
the crossfrre. They were the natural enemy in this War because it 
demanded complete obeisance to authority and subjugation to forces of 
unreasonable fear. However, the normal teenager is not wired to do either 
so the battle was joined. 
• 
7. RAY BRADBURY, SOMETHING WICKED THIS WAY COMES (1962); see a/so WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 2, sc. 1. Bradbury's novel is a coming-of-age story of two thirteen-
year-old boys reaching the gateway to maturity. one who reflects the brighter, trusting childhood 
side of that portal and the other, the darker, riskier adulthood side. Both are faced with decisions 
that can change their adolescence when a carnival comes to town that invites yet repels them with 
the Mephistophelean promise: they can grow up instantly by riding the carousel forward. Adults, 
on the other hand, are lured with the promise of renewed youth by riding the carousel backwards. 
The carnival feeds off people's fear, "living off the poison of the sins we do each other~ and the 
feunent of our most terrible regrets." BRADBURY, supra, at 203. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
The War on Drugs, declared by President Richard Nixon in the early 
1970s, indeed was and is a war insofar as, these days, U.S. citizens are 
persuaded that we are at war with any enemy that might threaten or has 
threatened the polity. When U.S. citizens are frightened enough to envision 
any number of harms that such an enemy might cause, then, of course, we 
must be mobilized to fight that enemy. Citizens of this country tend not to 
carefully analyze those claims so long as we are frightened sufficiently by 
those we are supposed to trust and in whom we have imposed the trust of 
our national safety and security. War also tends to make us want to 
embrace a national unity, just as we did in World War II. Thus, we 
breathlessly await our marching orders to combat the enemy or, at the very 
least, take pre-emptive measures to make sure the enemy will not breach 
this nation's defenses. We as a people tend not to be very reflective about 
the truth underlying those claims or the wisdom of the actions we are asked 
to take because war "is an enticing elixir."8 · 
The U.S. goverruttent's War on Drugs arose out of an actual, albeit 
over-hyped, need to solve problems posed by drug use and abuse in this 
country. This article is not intended to give short shrift to the harms caused 
by drug use, especially addiction, or to its ancillary impact on crime,· both 
violent and opportunistic. Nor is the article intended to give short shrift to 
the government's original goal of twinning treatment with law enforcement 
because, at the outset, the War on Drugs actually did emphasize the need to· 
fund treatment. But forty years later, the incessant drumbeat of war has · 
sidelined the treatment, and hence the preventive, effort to combat drug 
abuse and has instead focused on a militaristic approach that has driven the 
. 
War on Drugs into and through the nation's schools and has riven 
·constitutional protections from children. Unfortunately, · that driving 
impulse only thrived when the government implicitly framed the War as a 
struggle between good and evil for the soul of a nation and explicitly 
framed the War to play on the people's fears. This rhetorical use was also a 
ploy to divert the people's attention from the ravages of Vietnam to their 
Puritanical national self-image of being clean in body and mind. 
The love-hate relationship between non-medical drug use and the 
United States government has existed since the founding of the Republic.9 
As a new type of ingestible vice has been discovere~, the goverrunent has 
8. CHRIS HEDGES, WAR Is A FORCE THAT GIVES Us MEANING 3 (2002). "The enduring attraction of 
war is this: Even with its destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can 
give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living." /d. 
9. See generally Elaine Casey, History of Drug Use and Drug Users in the United States. THE 
NAT'L DRUG ABUSE CTR. FOR TRAINING REs. & DEV. {Nov. 1978), 
http://www .druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/CASEY l.htm. . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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reacted to inhibit its use, from alcohol and. to·bac·co to hemp ·and opiates. 10 
Early U.S. drug control efforts derived, for the most part, from a concern 
about the banns of overdosing on opiates, particularly the concern that 
citizens would misuse them without understanding their lethal tendencies or 
that people might even be drawn to them for cottunitting suicide. 11 But just 
as surely as the government wanted to exercise its parens patriae role to 
protect citizens from hartn, private social forces wanted to protect citizens 
from themselves and their tendencies to overindulge in pleasure. Indeed, 
. 
Prohibition was one of the more remarkable efforts by the government to 
· prevent citizens from indulging in a particular type of controlled substance 
·on such paired impulses of sparing citizens both harm and pleasure. 12 
These two controlling visions of the government's role in 
Prohibition and which implicitly informed the War on Drugs might be 
attributable to any number of forces, on either end of the political spectrum. 
Both religious conservatives and progressives were driving forces behind 
protecti~g citizens from the harms of abusing alcohol essentially a 
vi~timless vice. 13 Interwoven throughout those visions is the U.S.'s 
• 
Puritanical cultural tendency to control how others live and the underlying 
intolerance of those who do not ascribe to nor submit to that control. 14 
. 
Prohibition's spectacular failure in protecting citizens from themselves 
• 
presaged the problems that were systemic in the War on Drugs, posing 
similar issues of social and cultural control and intolerance. 
Those social and cultural impulses go a long way toward explaining 
why drug addiction, whether recreational or medical, has long been 
deplored in the United States. Opium and morphine were readily available 
for purchase over the counter in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
• 
centuries, but those who overindulged "opium drunkards" were 
derided.15 These drug prohibition efforts carne to a head after the Spanish-
l 0. See generally The 'Lectric Law Librruy, A History of Drog Use and Prohibition, 
http://www.lectlaw.com/files/drg09.htm; 'DIOMAS SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE 
·RITuAL PERSECUTION OF DRUGS, ADDICTS & PUSHERS, 183-212 (appx) (1974). 
11. David F. Musto, M.D., History of Legislative Control over Opium, Cocaine, and Their 
Derivatives, SHAFFER LmR. OF DRUG POL'Y, 
• 
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/ophs.htm. 
12. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 9; RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE 18TH AMENDMENT: 
TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, 19-20 (1995). 
13. ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHffiiTION: THE ERA OF EXCESS, 91-94 (1962). That is not to say that 
alcohol abuse does hot hann parties other than the drinker. However, the philosophical 
underpinnings for the early anti-drinking efforts targeted the individual's consumption rather than 
its consequences to others. /d. 
14. See, e.g., JAMES MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY 98-
99, 494-97 (2003). Ironically, colonial Puritans did not oppose drinking alcohol. Jd. at 284 
(alcohol was the "goodly creature of God"); HAMM, supra note 12, at 34-35. 
15. Musto, supra note 11. 
• 
• 
• 
. 
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Ainerican War when the United States took control of the. Philippines., 
• 
There, the government was confronted with a local, nonmedical opium 
market condemned by local missionaries. 16 The ·goverrmtent opted for . 
prohibition.17 
Notwithstanding modem variations of prohibition as a .drug control 
tactic, recreational drug use exploded in the 1960s and went mainstream. 18 
Concerned by this explosion in illicit drug use, President Lyndon Johnson 
• 
created the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, the precursor to the Drug 
Enforcement Administration. 19 Simultaneously, the government made 
special efforts to ·cut off the rising marijuana trade from Mexico.20- By 
1970, Congress had passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act.21 That legislation combined more than fifty pieces of disparate 
federal drug laws into one comprehensive act with a single system for 
controlling narcotics and psychotropics22 and provided for both criminal 
enforcement and drug treatment. When signing the Act into law, President 
Richard Nixon remarked on the need to "cure" drug addiction while at the 
same time addressing the need to add three hundred more law enforcement 
agents.23 '.'But sensationalism rather than rationality, ... guided the national 
conversation','24 about drugs. · 
In 1971., a report on heroin addiction among U.S. servicemen in 
Vietnam which later proved to be wildly inaccurate was_ released. 25 
16. /d. 
17. The prohibition movement against drugs was contemporaneous with the ternperance and anti-
saloon movements against alcohol. Id. 
18. Frontline: Drug Wars, Thirty Years of America's Drug War, A Chronology, PBS.ORG (Oct. 2000), 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pageslfrontlinelshows/ drugs/cron/. 
19. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin.,- 1970-1975, http://www.justice.gov/dea/ 
pubs/history/deahistory Ol.htm. The DEA is the "offspring" of the Bureau of Prohibition, an 
. . -
agency of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Id. 
20. Frontline Chronology, supra note 18. 
21. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 
1242 (1970); Frontline Chronology, supra note 18. 
22. DEA 197(}...1975, supra note 19~ . 
23. President Richard Nixon, Remarks on Signing_ the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 (Oct. 27, 1970), available at 
http://www.·presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2767. 
24. BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF THE WRONG 
TIJINGS: CRIME, DRUGS, MINORITIES, TEEN MOMS, KILLER KIDS, MUTANT MICROBES, PLANE 
CRASHES, ROAD RAGE, & So MUCH MORE, 131 (Basic Books 1999). 
25. Frontline Chronology, supra note 18; MORGAN F. MURPHY & ROBERT H. STEELE, THE WORLD 
HEROIN PROBLEM: REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION, H.R. REP. NO. 92-298 (June 22, 1971), 
available at www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/239/ 2391101003A.pdf. This House Report turns 
out to have grossly exaggerated troop heroin usage in Vietnam at 10-15%. !d. at 1. One of the 
Report's authors, Congressman Robert H. Steele, later recanted his representations, opining that 
servicemen'sheroin usage was more likely only 5%; one-half to one-third of the original estimate. 
That recantation was borne out by the results of Operation Golden Flow, a urinalysis program 
imposed on returning servicetnen that yielded only a 4.5% positive result for drug use. Jeremy 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Now President Nixon had a national security issue to which he could tie his 
anti-drug efforts. A month after the report's release, the President took his 
first war-like stance against drugs in a press conference on June 17, 1971: 
"America's public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse. In 
order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out 
offensive."26 His· employment of war analogies was clearly no accident and 
was a theme he used regardless of his audience27 throughout the remainder 
of his presidency,28 although the phrase "war on drugs" did not become the 
coin of the realm until September 22, 1972.29 By March 1973, Nixon had 
• 
crafted the DEA, exhorting Congress that "[t]his Administration has 
declared all-out, global war on the drug menace. As I reported to the 
Congress earlier this month in my State of the Union message, there is 
evidence of significant progress on a number of fronts in that war."30 By 
that time, Nixon's drug treatment agenda was no longer in evidence; only 
• 
the criminal enforcement agenda had the President's and the country's 
attention. 
Beyond Nixon's war-like rhetoric, "War on Drugs" really did not 
. become the brand name \l~til succeeding presidencies. Confining oneself to 
a ·simple search of officially recorded statements from the American 
. 
Presidency Project, one finds that President Geralr;l Ford in a much shorter 
presidency than Nixon's us~d the term in at least three official 
Kuzmarov, From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Jnsurgency: Vietnam and the International War 
on Drugs, 20 J. OF POL'Y HIST. 344,353 (2008); See also Frontline Chronology, supra note 18. 
26. President Richard Nixon, Remarks to the American People about an Intensified Program for Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971 ), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3047; see also President Richard Nixon, 
Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971), 
available at http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3048. 
27. Nixon used this refrain with media executives. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive 
Coma, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 829, 831 n.2 (2002). He also used this refrain with children. See, e.g., 
President Richard Nixon, Telephone Remarks to Students and Educators Attending a Drug 
Education Seminar in Monroe, Louisiana (Oct. 4, 1971), available at 
http://~.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3179. Further, he used this refrain with 
athletes. See, e.g., President Richard Nixon, Remarks to Athletes Attending a White House 
Sponsored Conference on Drug Abuse (Feb. 3, 1972), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3674. 
• 
28. President Richard Nixon, Radio Address on Crime and Drug Abuse (Oct. 15, 1972), available at 
http://www .presidency. ucsb.edulws/index·. php?pid=3631. 
29. President Richard Nixon, Statement about Drug Abuse Law Enforcen1ent (Sept. 22, 1972), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=3590. 
30. President Richard Nixon, Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973 
Establishing the Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 28, 1973), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=4159 . 
• 
. . 
• 
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statements.31 . Under a similar search, Presid~rit Jinm1y Carter never (or at 
least rarely) used that tertn. But the rhetoric intensified exponentially under 
President Ronald Reagan and went supernova under President George H.W. 
Bush.32 
President Reagan's engagement in the War on Drugs focused on 
choking off the supply of drugs, from both the street and abroad, under the 
logic that if the U.S. stops the illegal supply, then the demand will 
automatically vanish. Reagan's direct references to the War on Drugs in 
official statements and speeches surpassed President Ford's by a factor of 
seven. Although Reagan couched his War in terms of saving American 
lives, especially children's lives, his rhetoric nevertheless focused on taking 
the war to the suppliers. Reagan's allusions to war tactics were often less 
than subtle, using terms like "battlefield," "military intelligence,"33 "the 
deployment of the armed forces,"34 "battle,"35 and "crusade."36 Perhaps 
Reagan was no more warrior-like than in his tribute to law enforcement 
officers slain during the War on Drugs: 
America's liberty was purchased with the blood of heroes. Our release 
• 
from the bondage of illegal drug use is being won at the same dear price. 
The battle is ultimately over what America is and what America will be. · 
At our founding, we were promised the pursuit of happiness, not the myth 
of en4less ecstasy from a vial of white p~ison. We won our personal 
freedom so that we could serve God and Ill:~, so that we could freely 
produce and create and build a nation of strong families, rich farms, and 
• 
31. President Gerald Ford, Statement on Drug Abuse (Feb. 23, 1976), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=5609; President Gerald Ford, Special Message 
to the Congress on Drug Abuse (Apr. 27, 1976), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=5875; President Gerald Ford, Remarks at the 
Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Miami Beach, Florida 
(Sept. 27, 1976), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=6374. 
32. A keyword search of the American Presidency Project for documents of George H. W. Bush 
reveals 130 "official" entries using the tenn "war on drugs" and thirty-four using "drug war." See 
Am Presidency Project, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php. 
33. President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy (Oct. 2, 1982), 
available at http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=43085. 
34. President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Drug Abuse (Oct. 6, 1984), available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=39198. In contrast to military forces 
tasked with stopping the supply of drugs, Nancy Reagan was tasked with stopping dentand. Jd . 
See also President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the United States Coast Guard Acadenty 
Commencement Ceremony in New London, Connecticut (May 18, 1988), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=35847. 
35. President Ronald Reagan: Remarks to Media Executives at a White House Briefing on Drug 
Abuse (Mar. 7, 1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35521. 
36. President Ronald Reagan, Retnarks at a White House Ceremony Honoring Law Enforcement 
Officers Slain in the War on Drugs (Apr. 19, 1988), available at 
http://www .presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid= 3 5698. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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great cities. We. struggled for liberty in order to cherish it and defend it 
and transmit it undiminished to our children and theirs.37 
. 
Reagan also explicitly framed the War as a struggle .between "us" against 
"them," a struggle of national values against some unnamed terror~ 
· George H.W. Bush. brought with him to the . Presidency the warrior 
mindset to which he had devoted himself as Vice President as ~ip of the 
spear in the Reagan administration's War on Drugs. With well over one 
hundred official references in just a limited search of the American 
Presidency Project documents, the War on Drugs brand name and the 
phrase "drug wars" were ubiquitous in the Bush lexicon. Shortly after he 
was sworn in, President Bush made remarks after the swearing-in ceremony 
of the first "drug czar,"38 William Bennett/9 to oversee the new executive 
Office of National Drug Control Policy.40 In his statement, Bush joined the 
trajectory of increasingly explicit war references to the U.S.'s drug 
problem: 
. 
Bill is the first Director of the Nati~nal D~g Council (sic] Policy you, 
. . 
soldiers of this crusade. And drug abuse assaults the mind and the spirit 
of America, leaving damaged lives and destroyed careers. So, we've got 
. to mobilize our moral, spiritual, and economic resources to force a decline 
in drug trafficking and in drug abuse. 41 
. 
President Bush was probably at his most martially stirring with the 
• 
following: 
• 
Well, the soldiers in the drug battle have been risking their lives. Too 
often bureaucratic conflict here in Washington has hobbled our national 
effort. So, this has got to end. No war was ever won with two dozen 
generals acting independently. And I have chosen Bill Bennett to be the 
commanding general in the drug war. It is his responsibility, working 
. 
with the departments and agencies headed by those you see here with me 
37. /d. 
38. Historically, "czar'' refers to either a Russian emperor or an autocrat. Its contemporruy m~ning 
is "one in authority." WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY~ 284 (Houghton Miffiin Co. 
1995). 
39. Drug War History and Issues in a Nutshell, DRUG ACTION NETWORK (2002-2003), 
http://drugactionnetwork.com: 16080/history/?content=drugwar. Bennett's appointment was more 
than a little ironic given his addictions to smoking and gambling as well as his penchant for 
drinking. /d. 
40. Id. 
41. President George Bush, Remarks Following the Swearing-in Ceren1ony for William J. Bennett as 
Director of National Drug Control Policy (Mar. 13, 1989), available at 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 16769. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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and oth~rs, to develop a strategy for this war. So, I c~arge him with 
putting all the parts of the Federal Government in harness, pulling together 
in a life-and-death struggle against a deadly enemy. I will not tolerate, 
and the country cannot afford, bureaucratic infighting that forces us to 
fight this battle with one ann tied behind our back. 42 
Bennett responded in kind: 
The President has asked for total effort. He has asked for action on each 
and every front. . . . We want to see waiting lines for drug treatment 
reduced and prison cells for drug pushers increased .... [T]his 
administration wants to work with all the good citizens of America to win 
the war.43 
11 
As a consequence, highlights of Bush's War on Drugs included a 50% 
increase in military spending to combat drug trafficking and the U.S. 
invasion of Panama to arre~t General Manuel Noriega on trafficking, 
racketeering, and money laundering charges.44 
President Bill Clinton seemed rarely to make official reference to the 
War on Drugs except at press briefings, but his administration was keen to 
continue the progress in .reducing the U.S.'s drug problems. Part of 
Clinton's. silence resulted from a deliberate policy to tone down the 
overheated anti-drug rhetoric and thereby redirect the War's efforts to 
treatment and prevention.45 Unfortunately, he found de-politicizing, or 
perhaps de-milita~zing, the War to be difficult, and he was unable to get 
. the then-Republican Congress to redirect money from interdiction and law 
enforcement.46 Additionally ~nfortunate were the political attacks during 
his 1996 re-election campaign that his "liberal, drug policies were not 
working. As a consequence, Clinton increased his anti-drug rhetoric to out-
shout his opponent, Bob Dole.47 Indeed~ the Clinton presidency is notable 
for its significant up-tick in military and law-enforcement operations, 
including the arrests of leaders of the Colombian Cali cartel and of Mexican 
bankers for money-laundering (Operation Casablanca).48 And in harmony 
with the adage that "no politician has ever seen his approval ratings decline 
• 
42. /d. 
43. /d. 
44. Frontline Chronology, supra note 18. 
45. GLASSNER, supra note 24, at 136. 
46. Michael Kramer, The Political Interest: The Phony Drug War, TIME, Sept. 2, 1996, 
http://www. time.com/timelmagazine/article/0,9171 ,985050,00.html. 
47. GLASSNER, supra note 24, at 136-37. 
48. Frontline Chronology, supra note 18. 
• 
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by · being tough on · drugs, "49 the Clinton ·administration expanded federal 
law enforcement dramatically with "hard-line penal policies."50 
That hard-line approach did not change during the presidency of 
George W. Bush. But during his two-term presidency, Bush was less of a 
cheerleader in the War on Drugs and more of an enabler. A mere handful 
of mon~s into his first . tenn, Bush had a War on Terror to fight .so he 
handed off the important combat operations of the War on Drugs to 
appointees. Employing the services of the Depal'bnent of Justice, Attorney . 
General John D. Ashcroft early on vowed to oppose teen drug use, 51 but his 
rhetoric was· nevertheless war-like: "Well, I want to escalate the war on 
drugs. I want to renew it. I want to refresh it, relaunch it if you will."52 
Bush's first appointee to head the DEA, Asa Hutchinson, viewed the War 
on Drugs. as a crusade, having spent a significant amount of time as a 
Congressman on drug war issues while favoring an escalation of the. War in 
Colombia and refusing to retreat from draconian sentencing for drug 
users.53 Likewise, Bush's Drug Czar, John Walters, brought a background 
that relied extensively on the "Andean Strategy," a decade-long plan 
costing billions of dollars and escalating the War's mili~ary operations in 
Latin Amenca.54 · 
Unfortunately, the War on Terror intensified the fervor for the War on 
Drugs. Not to be outdone by the attention paid to the War on Terror, the . 
. drug warriors had to up the ante. Less than a month after th~ September 11 
attacks, a State Department director testified to links between the Taliban 
and financing terrorist activities through drug trade. 55 At a criminal justice 
49. Kramer, supra note 46. 
50. Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carcera/ State: The Future of Penal Policy Refonn, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1693, 1740 (2006). 
51. David A. Vise & Dan Eggen, U.S.: Violence, Teen Drug Use Are Ashcroft Priorities, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 8, 2001, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n228/a04.html?l267. 
52. President Bush Appoints Drog Warriors to High Administration Positions, COMMON SENSE FOR 
DRUG POL'Y, available at www.csdp.org/news/news/warcabinet.htm; GoTISCHALK, supra note 
50, at 1740 . 
• 
53. COMMON SENSE, supra note 52. 
54. /d. 
55. RAPHAEL F. PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21041, TALIBAN AND THE DRUG TRADE 4 (2001), 
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdf; William Bach, Director, Office 
of Asia, Africa, Europe, NIS Programs, Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform 
• 
U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human 
Resources (Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/septll/testimony_OOl.asp; see 
also Doug Stokes, "Iron Fists in Iron Gloves": The Political Economy of U.S. Terrorocracy 
Promotion in Colombia, 8 BRITISH J. POL. & INT'L STUD. 368 (2006) (positing that U.S. long-
tetm interests in financing counter;.insurgency efforts in Colombia conveniently shifted from an 
anti-communism rationale to anti-drug and anti-terrorism). 
• 
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conference in London during Summer 2002, Asa Hutchinson likened the 
War on Drugs to the combating of terrorism: 
I am here to speak about another war today the war on drugs. · It is 
perhaps not as intriguing as the war on terrorism ···-but as we know drug 
trafficking and terrorism are two _ evils that exist in the same 
jungle. ~ .. The nations represented in this room understand the human 
suffering that comes with war. We know that war should be avoided, but 
not at the sacrifice of freedom. We know wars are fought to sustain 
democracy, but they are not without costs. We know that the-costs of war 
mu.st be weighed against what is lost when evil triumphs. 
These realities of war are common in democratic societies. We know they 
are also true when it comes to our shared struggle against illegal drugs. If 
we avoid war, then democracy will suffer; if we flinch at the costs, then a 
greater price will be paid 'by families, by communities, and by our 
nations. 56 
Not to be outd~ne, Attorney General Ashcroft went on an extended crusade 
against cbug paraphemalia57 and medical marijuana,58 taking the War to 
new heights of law enforcement power.59 By 2005, federal and state 
governments were spending nearly sixty times more on cleaning_ up after 
substance abuse problems than on prevention.60 · -
Nearly forty years into the War on Drugs, its victories are Pyrrhic at 
best. Experts criticized its misdirection early61 and continually.62 Aside 
from the geopolitical disaster it caused, the War's effect on the U.S. itself 
• 
56. Asa Hutchinson, Director, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Speech at Modernizing Criminal Justice 
Conference (June 1_8, 2002}, available at www.justice.gov/ dea/speechesls061802p.html. 
57. Jesse Katz, White House Tries to Ban the Bong, ROLLING STONE, 54 (July 24, 2003). 
58. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
59. In his crusading zeal, Ashcroft even used the full weight of the Justice Department to convey his 
displeasure against any federal judges perceived as not committed enough to the War: 
In 2004,-Republicans on the ·House Judiciary Committee led a successful effort to 
force the_ United States Sentencing Commission to provide Congress with the names of 
federal judges who departed from [drug] sentencing guidelines. In August 2003, the 
Justice Department announced it would begin compiling data on judges who mete out 
lighter sentences than the federal guidelines prescribe, a move some critics likened to 
the creation of a "blacklist,, of judges. 
Gottschalk, supra note. 50, at 1740. 
60. Nat'l Ctr. on Addiction & Substance Abuse at Columbia U., Shoveling Up II: The Impact of 
Substance Abuse on Federal, State and Local Budgets, ii (May 2009). 
6L See generally Merrill A. Smith, 11le Drog Problem-Is There an Answer?, 52 FEo. PROBATION 3 
(1988). 
62. Ben Wallace-Wells & Eric Magnuson, How-America Lost the War on Drugs, ROLLING STONE, 90 
(Dec. 13~ 2Q07) . 
• 
• 
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has been enonnous~ . · The criticisms ·range _ from the economic63 to the 
cynical, including the view that the War is merely a political game to 
position politicians for re-election.64 Others criticized its emphasis on law 
enforcement rather than on public health. 65 One typically astringent 
observation is that the War was waged without e?C-amining the effectiveness 
of the weapons66 while another is that the U.S. now has an unthinkably 
huge prison population, bloated by the increasingly harsh and indefensible 
critninal penalties for drug offenses67 that are racist.68 As all these critics 
and critiques agree, "Drug abuse is bad, but the drug war is worse."69 
Perhaps worst of all is that the pride of the U.S. govetnment, its rule of law, 
went missing in action. 70 
• 
. . 
63. See, e.g.; Matthew A. Christiansen, A Great Schism: Social Nonns and Marijuana Prohibition, 4 
HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 229 (2010); Cynthia S. Duncan, Note, The Need for Change: An 
Economic Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1701 (2009); Mary Carmichael, The 
Case for Treating Drug Addicts · in Prison, NEWSWEEK (June 29, 2010), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/29/the-case-for-treating-drug-addicts-in-prison.html. 
64. Ross C. "Rocky" Anderson, We Are All Casualties of Friendly Fire in the· War on Drogs, 13 
UTAH B. J. 10, 10 (Nov. 2000). . 
65. See, e.g., NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASS'N, REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DRUG 
POL~Y TASK FORCE: lll. PuB. HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT DRUG POL,Y (Oct. 1996), 
available at http://www .drugtext.org/New-York-County-Lawyers· Association/iii -public-health-
consequences-of-current-drug-policy.html. 
66. Anderson, supra note 64, at 12. 
67. See, e.g., Eric Schlosser, More Reefer Madness, THE ATL. MONTHLY, (April1997), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97apr/reef.htm. "The war on drugs has helped tum 
the United States into the country with the world's largest prison population .... The U.S. has 5% 
of the world's population and around 25% of the world's prisoners." Bernd Debusmann, 
• 
Einstein, Insanity and the War on Drugs, THE GREAT DEBATE (Dec. 3, 2008, 10:02 PM), 
blogs.reuters/great-debate/2008/12/03/Einstein-insanity-and-the·war-on-dnlgs/. 
68. See, e.g., Andrew D. Black, Note, "The War on People:" Reframing "The War on Drugs" by 
Addressing Racism within American Drug Policy Through Restorative Justice and Community 
Collaboration, 46 U. LoUISVILLE L. REv. 177 (2007-2008); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: 
The New Jim Crow, 63 ALA. L. REv. 703 (2000). 
69. Drug Abuse is Bad, But the Drug War Is Worse, CHRISTIANSAGAINSTPROHIBITION.ORG (Aug. 8, 
2010), http://christiansagainstprohibition.org/LEAP _Drug_ War_ Worse_Handout. 
70. See, e~g., Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1992-1993); Roger Pilon, Tenants, Students. and Drugs: A Comment on 
the War on the Rule of Law, 2002 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 227,227 (2002). 
• 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
2011] ,. War as Metaphor 
• 
III. GO ASK ALICE71 
• 
• 
The War-on-Drugs trope in schools did not focus on militarized 
language at the outset because one of the underlying themes of the War was 
to protect children's health and safety by keeping them away from drugs 
and by reducing the violence th~t allegedly accompanies drug abuse and· 
. 
dealing in the schools. These good intentions did not have any real focus 
until it became the First Lady's project under Nancy Reagan in the mid-
l980s. Simultaneously, her husband began to frame the War in schools as 
· just one part of the overall battle plan. That framing escalated into mission 
creep until, today, school officials often view themselves as warriors ·with 
individual military tasks and view students as the military obJectives. The 
fault lies with all three branches of the federal govermnent and their 
individual responses to the militarized metaphor, crossing the line from 
metaphorical marketing to literal application. · 
A. The Executive: "Uncle Sam Wants Y ou"72 
From the beginning, the U.S's pursuit of the enemy in the War on 
Drugs has targeted those engaged in drug trafficking, with legislation and 
goverrunent agencies designed for interdiction through law enforcement 
and military engagement.73 Although Nixon's vision was to include drug 
treatment as a War strategy, the U.S. government did not prioritize 
prevention as a strategy, instead focusing on supply rather than demand. In 
the mid-1970s, a parental movement against teen drug abuse had loosely 
coalesced, and the National Institute- of Drug Abuse joined the parents' 
• 
71. ANONYMOUS, Go ASK ALICE (1971 ); see also JEFFERSON AIRPLANE, White Rabbit, on 
SURREALISTIC PILLOWt (RCA Victor 1967). Go Ask Alice is a young adult book about the perils 
of drug addiction, published just as the War on Drugs was beginning its windup. It "was 
• 
published in 1971 as a 'real diary' about a good girl who is turned on to drugs by friends, runs 
away, trades sex for fixes and dies." Mark Oppenheimer, Just Say ·Uh-Oh; 'N.Y. TIMES, 1 (Nov. 
15, 1998), available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/booksl 98/1111 S/reviews/9811 S.lSoppenht.html. 
Originally touted as the actual diary of a teenage girl, the book is now listed by the publisher as · 
·fiction after its "editort Beatrice Sparks, conceded that the book is not entirely true. Further 
inquiry suggests that none of it is true. Lina Goldberg, ,.Curio user and Curiouser ": Fact, 
Fiction, and th.e Anonymous Author of Go Ask Alice, 2 (Oct. 2002), available at 
http://www.linagoldberg.com/goaskalicel html. The book became and remains; to a certain 
extent, a popular teen book. ld~ at 5. Unfortunately, the book reflects the overly simplistic 
framing of the_ teen drug problem adopted during the War: "Fall in with the wrong crowd and you 
will do drugs, turn against America and dishonor your parents." Oppenheimer, supra, at 2. 
72. James Montgomery Flagg, I Want You/or the U.S. Anny, LESLIE,S WEEKLY cover (July 6, 1916), 
available at http://wwwJoc.gov/exhibits/treasures/tl'mOlS. html. 
73. See generally Frontline Chronology, supra note 18. 
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effort.74 But their ·strategy did not really ·focus on r~ducing. demand, 
especially not on the source· of risky and addictive behavior in adolescence .. 
Instead, these national efforts targeted Hollywood and the media as the 
enemies and took them to task for glamorizing drugs as the cause for teen 
drug use.75 Eventually, attacking these hard targets was not enough because 
its focus was wrong-headed and did not directly engage the real enemy. 
President Reagan made no secret of the fact that schools themselves 
were battlefields in· the War on Drugs. 76 However, it was not until 1984 
. 
that the women's auxiliary undertook its wartime task when Nancy Reagan 
adopted her campaign against student drug use, following an appearance at 
an Oakland, California school.77 In the oft-repeated story, a ten-year-old 
student asked Mrs. Reagan what she should do if someone were to offer her 
drugs. Mrs. Reagan resp.onded, ·''Just say no.''78 From that incident, "Just 
Say No" clubs sprang up all over the country, backed by the govermnent 
but funded by private and corporate donors.79 Thereafter, President Reagan 
repeatedly referenced Mrs .. Reagan's war efforts whenever he spoke about 
the War on Drugs.80 The "Just Say No" campaign was an essential part of 
. 
. 
. . 
74. /d. If the War on Drugs could be said to have any war profiteers, Dr. Robert DuPont, bead of the 
Nat'l Iilst. ofDrug Abuse from 1973 to 1978, would be one of them. Since leaving government, 
. . 
DuPont has reap~ significant commercial benefit as. a leading proponent of urinalysis testing.· 
DuPont's company Bensinger, DuPont Associates-manages alcohol and drug testing in the 
workplace. See http://www.bensingerdupont.com/; Ryan Grim, Blowing Smoke.: Why random 
drug testing doem't reduce student drug use, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2006, 1:13 PM), , 
www .slate.comltoolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2138399. 
75. See, e.g., Frontline· Chronology, supra note 18; see also H. Republican Pol'y Comm., Clinton 
Raises White Flag: Policy Statement on How to Win the War on Dru_gs, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1996/lupc_drugs.htm (last updated October 1, 2006). 
76. Remarks to Media Executives at a White House Briefing on Drug Abuse, supra note35. 
77. Frontline Chronology, supra note 18; Claire Suddath, The War on Drogs, TIME, Mar. 25, 2009, 
available at www~time.com/time/printout/0,8816, 1887488,00.html. 
78. Suddath, supra note 77; President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a Campaign Rally for Senator 
James T. Broyhill in Raleigh, North Carolina (Oct 8; 1986), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?p.id=36567; President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at 
a White House Briefing for Senior Staff on the Congressional and. Gubernatorial Election Results. 
(Nov~ 6, 1986), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=36695; President 
Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the National Conference on Corporate Initiatives for ·a Drug Free 
Workplace (June 9, 19,88), ·available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/wslindex.php?pid= 
35950. 
79. Frontline Chronology, supra note 18;. Suddath, supra note 77; President Ronald Reagan, Remarks 
on Signing the Just Say No to Drugs Week Proclamation (May 20, 1986), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb. edulwslindex.php?pid=37306. 
80. Remarks on Signing th~ Just Say No to Drugs. Week Proclamation, supra note 79. Reagan's 
remarks about his wife's involvement in the War on Drugs was not unlike· the publicity of Eleanor 
Roosevelt's panicipation in the "Knitting for Victory'' campaign during World War II. Paula 
Becker, Knitting for Victory-World War II, HISTORYLINK.ORG (Aug. 19, 2004), 
http://www .historylink.orglindex.cfm?DisplayPage=output cfm&File _ Id==5722; Knitting During 
• 
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-. Reagan's War, but n~· cotmnitment existed to coordin~te what was 
essentially a volunteer anny to any specific govermnent effort to prevent 
drug abuse in schools. His successor would. become the chief recruiter of 
drug warriors in schools. 
From the beginning of his term, President George H. W. Bush 
specifically incorporated schools into his drug-war rhetoric and battle plans. . 
He started out moderately: "To spread the word and thus stem demand, 
' ' 
we're going to need more money for education and prevention .... And. we 
need to educate, involve parents, teachers, and cotmnunities .. ''81 · Barely a 
we;ek later,. Bush explicitly recruited students in the War: "You have 
partners in your cotnmunity and in others across the United States, and you 
have partners in the war on drugs in Washington, right there on 
Pennsylvania Avenue .... I need, your help.'"82 One of those partners would 
be law enforcement in the schools: 
I mentioned that I'm going to talk about enforcement later on today,_ but I 
don't want to leave here without saying to you the enforcement side of 
this equation· is absolutely essential, whether it's in the corridors of this 
outstanding high achievement school or whether it's downtown Lancaster 
or wherever it is. The authorities must enforce the law, and we must make 
an example of those who are pushing drugs onto the lives of the oth~rs 
around here ..... The war on drugs will ultimately be won one day, one 
battle at a time the battles each and every one of us wage to keep our 
families and commu.tiities free from drug abuse .... And so, let these 
banners be a battle cry ... we will join together, turn the tide, and bring 
the epidemic to an end with finality over history. 83 
Not only were students rec~ited as co-combatants,_ but school 
employees were the warrior-leaders: ''As I look around here today, I see 
some of the top commandos in the war on drugs: our teachers, principals, 
community leaders, parents, and students."84 The cause had been joined . 
• 
World War II, NAT'L WWII MUSEUM, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/calendarlknit-your-
bit.htrill#Knitting_ during_ World_ War_ll. . 
81. Remarks Following the Swearing-In Ceremony for William J. Bennett as Director ofNat'l Drug 
Control Pol ,y, supra note 41. 
82. President George Bush, Remarks to Students at Conestoga Valley High School in Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania (Mar. 22, l989)~ available at www.presidency.ucsb .. edu/ws/index.php?pid=l6823. 
83. ld. 
84, President George Bush, Re~narks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Drug-Free Schools Awards 
(June 19, 1989), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/wslindex.php?pid=l7168. 
• 
• 
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B. The Legislature: "Are YOU Doing All You Can?"85 . 
An army, however, needs artillery and munitions, so Congress 
complied by enacting mandates to help schools prevent drug abuse, usually 
obliquely and nominally, but mainly to force them _to become drug-free. 
Al~ough Congress passed numerous statutes designed to curb youth drug 
abuse,86 the primary legislation ~o focus . on schools derived from the 
Reagan-era Drug-Free Schools and Connnunities Act of 1986, a component 
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.87 The latter Act was but one of 
several in the Drug-Free America Act of 1986,88 touted by President 
Reagan as essential to "this national crusade, [in which] each of us is a 
critical soldier.''89 That version of the Drug-Free Schools Act focused on 
"enforcement, prevention, and intervention to reduce illegal drug use"90 and 
provided funding for schools to reduce student drug abuse.91 State and 
local grants were funded and· awarded to "encourage and support broad-
based cooperation among schools, connnunities, parents, and governmental 
agencies."92 Unfortunately, the Orug-Free Schools Act is now· 
. 
char~cterized as one ()f the strategies for "fuel[ing] the war on drugs and 
. . 
• 
. 
85. Libr. of Cong., General Cable Corp.. poster · (1942), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/teacherslclassroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/ 
presentationslhomefront/ gallery.html. 
86. See U.S. GoV'T. ACCOUNfABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-3, SAFE AND DRUG·FREE SCHOOLS: 
BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY WITH STATE AND LocAL FLEXIBll..ITY 7-9 (1997) [hereinafter 
1997 GAO ACCOUNrABILITY REP.]; see also U.S. GoV'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAOff-
HEHS-97-166, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION: MULTIPLE YOUTH PROGRAMS . 
RAISE QUESTIONS OF EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 1-2 (1997); see generally EDITH 
FAIRMAN COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20532, 1HE SAFE AND DRUG-FREE SCHOOLS 
AND COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 2 (2002). 
87. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat 3207 (1986); COOPER, supra note 86, 
at I n.4. 
88. President Ronald Reagan, Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Combat 
Drug Abuse and Trafficking (Sept. 15, 1986), available at 
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/091586b.htm. , 
89. /d. 
90. · Melody Lark, The Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1986: Policy. Fonnation, 
Causation, and Program Implementation, I (1995) (paper presented at Annual Meeting of Am. 
Educ. Res. Ass'n), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ PDFSIED389994.pdf. 
91. Peter Reuter & P. Michael Timpane, Options for Restructuring the Safe and Drug-Free Schools 
and Communities Act in PETER REUTER ET AL., OPTIONS FOR RESTRUCTURING THE SAFE AND 
DRUG-fREE SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES ACT: REPORT WITH BACKGROUND PAPERS AND FOCUS 
GROUP SUMMARY 4 (RAND Monograph Rep. 2001), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MRI328.1/MR1328.1.options.pdf [hereinafter 
REUTER RAND MONOGRAPH]. 
92. SARAH M. BENNETT-HARPER, ET AL., CHARACTERISTICS OF SDFSCA SEA. AND GoVERNORS' 
PROGRAMS: VOL. I, SUMM. OF THE 1999-2000 DATA COLLECTION 1-1 (U.S. Dep't. of Educ. 
2002), available at http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/ safety/9900statereport/report.pdf. 
• 
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. 
perpetuat[ing] it in schools throughout the riation."93 It and related state 
policies are criticized for being "[in]compatible with the perspectives of the 
education administrators or the experiences of the target group~­
students,"94 particularly because the federal funding was intended to finance 
law enforcement in the schools instead of prevention programs. 95 
In 1988, Congress did try to focus more on drug use prevention and 
education when it moved the Drug-Free Schools Act to the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),96 and amended it with the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 198897 and later with the Drug-Free Schools and 
· Cotmt1unities Act of 1989.98 The 1988 amendments were to furnish 
additional resources for states and local agencies to use for "drug abuse 
prevention, early intervention, rehabilitation referral, and education in 
elementary and secondary schools."99 However, Congress's attention 
ineluctably moved back to militarization of the War on Drugs, even in 
schools. In 1990, President Bush and the governors adopted six millennial 
goals f~r the nation's schools to achieve. 100 Goal . number six asserted that, 
by 2000, "every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and 
will offer a disciplined environment conducive to leaming."101 The group 
promoted education and community involvement as two resources to 
achi~ve this goal, but · the most prominent resource was discipline. 102 
Perhaps. this route was adopted because of public testimony in its favor: 103 
the "written testimony [for goal six] focused .disproportionately on 
discipline,"104 and the teachers' unions linked school discipline with ·student 
• 
• 
93. Lark, supra note 90, at 1. 
94. /d. at 16. 
95. ld. • 
96. Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat 27 (1965); COOPER, supra 
note 86, at I. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was originally enacted in 
1965, as part and parcel of the War on Poverty. As a spending act, ESEA requires reauthorization 
every six years. Its current iteration includes the No Child Left Behind Act. A Glossary of School 
· Finance Terms, EDSOURCE 5 (Aug. 2004), http://www.llesd.k12.ca.us!EEE_FinanceTetnls.pdf. 
97. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat 4181 (1988); HAw. ST. DEP'T. OF 
EDUC., OFFICE OF INSTRUCTIONAL SERV., DRUG-FREE SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES ACT OF 
1986, PART 2, HANDBOOK 1 (1989). 
98. Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-226, 103 Stat. 
1934 (1989). 
99. HAW. ST. DEP'T OF Epuc., supra note 97, at 1. 
100. JAMES B. STEDMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ED 359634, NATIONAL EDUCATION GoALS: 
WHERE ARE WE Now? 6 (1990), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ PDFSIED359634.pdf. 
101. /d. at 21. 
102. Id. at 23. 
103. NAT'L EDUC. GoALS PANEL, MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARD THE NATIONAL EDUCATION 
GoALS: PUBLIC TESTIMONY, VOL. 2: SUMM. OF TESTIMONY ON MEASURES FOR 1991 PROGRESS 
REP. 23 (1991), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED334275.pdf. 
104. Id. 
• 
• 
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drug problems. 1 ~5 In so doing, student drug use became inextricably and 
incorrectly linked to school safety rather than standing as a singular 
problem with its own unique solutions. . 
When Congress reauthorized the ESEA in 1994, as the Improving . 
America's Schools Act,106 it re-branded the Drug-Free Schools and 
Conununities portion of the ESEA by incorporating it with the Safe Schools· 
Act to become, together, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities 
Act of 1994 (SDFSC).107 · The purpose of this marriage of acts was to "help 
the nation's schools provide a disciplined environment conducive to 
learning by eliminating violence in and around schools and preventing 
illegal drug use." 108 Congress thereby expressly linked . state and local 
. 
grants for student drug problems with violence reduction and school 
safety. 109 SDFSC also incorporated accountability standards to review the 
use of those funds. 110 By making that link, Congress hoped to achieve 
schools entirely-free of violence, drugs, alcohol, and guns by the year 2000.· 
Unfortunately, accountability proved ephemeral.111 A Congressional 
Research Service report noted the following: 
. 
In 2000, a national evaluation of the SDFSC program by [the Department 
of Education] was released. Surveyors found that the efforts of several 
[local educational agencies] to reduce school violence and drug use 
. . 
through the program were haphazard, and federal funds might be spread 
too thin. Also, it was· found that only 50% of the 600 [local educational 
agencies] canvassed have a definitive goal in place for prevention efforts, 
• 
such as changing student behaviors or attitudes toward violence and drug 
. 
use; [local educational agencies] with a goal lacked quality data to assess 
105. !d. at 25. 
106. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4029 (1994); 1997 
GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at 5. 
• 
107. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994); COOPER, supra 
note 86, at 1; 1997 GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at 1. 
108. 1997 GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at l. 
. 
109. The states' allotments were divided into 20% for governors' grants and 80% for local schools. 
Lawrence W. Shennan, The Safe and Drog-Free Schools Program, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
Eouc. POL'Y: 2000 125, 142 (2000), available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/joumalslbrookings _papers_ on_ education_ policy/v2000/2000.1 sherman. pdf. 
Lawrence Shennan suggests that this discretionary funding was ''wasted on perfonning 
magicians, fishing trips, and school concerts and on methods (such as counseling) that research 
shows to be inefrective." /d. at 126. Whether or not Shennan's comments are hyperbole, it is true 
that three years after the 1994 enactment of SDFSC, DOE had completed no overall evaluation of 
the grants program. 1997 GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at 4. 
110. 1997 GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at 3, 9. 
111. See id. at 5; Robert B. Charles, Back to the Future: The Collapse of National Drog Control Policy 
and a Blueprint for Revitalizing the Nation's Counternarcotics Effort, 33 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 339, 
403 (1996). 
• 
• 
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progress; and only 9% had implemented prevention programs based on 
research. Others used programs like D.A.R.E., which has been found by 
some analysts to be ineffective. The [Department of Education] 
concluded that it was questionable to what extent [local educational 
agencies] were complying with the Principles of Effectiveness that require 
gran~ees to use program funds to support research-based drug and violence 
prevention programs for youth. 112 
21 
Nevertheless, Congress persisted in repeating the same· mistakes in the War 
in schools. 
The 2002 ESEA reauthorization the No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB)113 once again incorporated the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and 
Communities Act; this time as an integral part of ESEA's Title IV- 21st 
Century Schools . 114 This iteration of the drug-free schools effort focuses on 
both state and federal grants115 to "prevent the illegal use of alcohol, 
. . . 
tobacco, and drugs ... [and] to foster a safe and drug-free learning 
environment that supports student academic achievement."116 Local school 
districts can apply for funds to finance discipline, law enforcement, and 
· prevention, including "security activities"; "student testing and data 
reporting''; "education activities"; "counseling, mentoring and other student 
support activities"; "training and monitoring of school personnel"'; and 
ufamily, c_ommunity, and emergency activities."117 The receipt of funds is 
conditioned on the local sc~ool district's providing a plan for keeping its 
schools drug- and violence-free, and this plan should include school 
discipline policies that prohibit disorderly conduct and illegal possession of 
drugs and weapons;· security procedures; prevention activities for a safe 
environment; a crisis management plan; and a code of conduct. us Thus; in 
order to get funds, schools must conflate violence with student drug use: 
"[T]he program . · .. embodies confusion of purposes among drug 
prevention, violence prevention, and school safety,"119 As a result, schools 
112. COOPER, supra note 86, at 27-28. · 
113. No Child Left Behind Act of200l, Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). 
114. COOPER, supra note 86, at 2; GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 34496, SAFE AND 
DRUG-fREE SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES ACT: PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND REAUTHORIZATION 
• 
ISSUES 1 (2008). 
115. MCCALLION, supra note 114, at 1. 
116. 20 u.s.c. § 7102 (2006). 
117. McCALLION, supra note 114, at 3-4; 20 U.S.C. § 7115(b)(2) (2006). 
11s. 20 u.s.c~ § 7Il4(d)(7) (2006). 
• 
• 
119. REUTER & TIMPANE, supra note 91, at 5; 20 U.S.C. §7115(b)(2)(E) (Supp. 2.011) ("drug and 
violence prevention activities that may include the following .... ''). Similarly suspect are efforts 
to couple student drug use with academic failure under No Child Left Behind and to thereby 
advocate adding to the Act a new and selective assessment for an additional SQb-population of 
students. See Judy Kreamer et al., The Overlooked Cause of Children Being Left Behind: Drug 
. . 
Use Compromising Academic Success, EDUCATING VOICES, INC. (Feb. 2008), 
• 
• 
• 
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. :·are incorrectly encouraged to merge law enforcement with educational 
prevention strategies to address their student drug problems. 
This conflation of violence and drug use did little more than· 
increasingly militarize the efforts to contain student drug problems. 
Although student drug abuse is likely systemic, violence is not. Schools are 
much safer than political forces. make them out to be: "Any school violence 
is too much, but it is disastrous to make policy on misinterpretation of data .. 
Comparisons of violence iri various settings indicate that schools ~e one of 
the safest institutions for children .. "12° Furthermore, the research-based 
evidence does not conclusively link drug ·use to school violence or, at the 
very least, cannot conclusively establish causation .. 121 The crucial 
connection is that a violent student is more likely to use drugs; a student's 
predisposition to violence may also predispose him to drug use. 122 
However, solving one problem does not necessarily solve the other. So 
when the govermnent is willing to fund drug testing and locker searches in 
the War on Drugs, 123 the government is erroneously suggesting to school 
. officials that punitive law enforcement strategies designed to curb violence 
http://www.studentdrugtesting.org/EVJO/o20education 
%20and%20drug0/o20use%20white%20paper0/b20jul08.pdf. .There . is no dispute that drugs may 
have serious physiologi~al and psychological effects on the user although those effects will vary 
depending upon the drug. However, to urge that drug use is the sole cause of or even any cause of 
. . . 
academic failure is an overly simplistic conclusion to a problem that has so many more variables. 
See id. at 7-11. The authors' own professional experiences should have suggested a more 
nuanced-and more comprehensive policy prescription than to increase schools'. already 
onerous assessment responsibilities under NCLB. See id. at 16. Besides, at least one empirical 
. 
study indicates that student drug use, by itself, adversely affects neither behavior nor academic 
perfonnance. Thomas J. McMahon & Sunya ~. Luthar, Patterns and Correlates of Substance Use 
Among Affluent, Suburban High School Students, 35 J. CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHOL. 72, 85-86 (2006). 
120. Irwin A. Hyman et al., Policy and Practice in School Discipline: Past, Present and Future, 4 
(1994), http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED383960.pdf. 
121. See, e.g., Sharon M. Boles & Karen Miotto, Substance Abuse and Violence: A Review of the 
Literature, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 155, 165 (2003); Robert Nash Parker & Kathleen 
Auerhahn, Alcohol, Drugs, and Violence, 24 ANN. REv. Soc. 291, 306-307 (19~8); see also 
Michele Cooley-Strickland et al., Community Violence and Youth: Affoct, Behavior, Substance 
Use, and Academics, 12 CLINIC-t\L CHILD FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 127 (2009); but see Kristin D. 
Eisenbraun, Violence in Schools: Prevalence, Prediction, and Prevention, 12 AGGRESSION & 
VIOLENT BEHAV. 459, 462 (2007); Richard Lowry et al., School Violence, Substance Use, and 
Availability of Illegal Drugs on School Property among US High School Students, 69 J. SCH. 
HEALTH 34 7 (2009). Alcohol is the more likely culprit in causing violent behavior in general 
while drug dealing is the more likely culprit in violent behavior associated w~th drugs. Boles & 
Miotto, supra, at 161 , 165. 
122. Peter Venturelli, Drugs in Schools: Myths and Realities, 561 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 
72, 77 (Jan. 2000). Adolescent violence is linked to other impulsive and risk-taking behaviors . 
. 
Boles & Miotto, supra note 121, at 157. 
123. MCCALLION, supra note 114, at 3. As part of their drug prevention strategies, school districts can 
get funding for drug testing and locker searches. 20 U.S.C. § 4115(b)(2)(E)(xiv) (2006). 
• 
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will be just as successful at solving their student drug problems. That 
fallacious linkage is specifically contrary to the traditional educational 
philosophy that prevention strategies in student violence are more 
successful than punitive strategies. 124 "These debates reveal the extent to 
which we ignore and/or distort social science data and support punitive 
practices such as corporal punishment, school suspensions and expulsions, 
and questionable measures such as metal detectors, strip searches, and 
draconian sentencing for minors."125 And that fallacious linkage is clearly 
contrary to the empirical evidence that Congress's war-time efforts are an 
abysmal failure; by 2006, . the Office of Management and Budget rated the 
state grants prograrn for Safe and Drug-Free Schools as "not perfortning: 
results not demonstrated." 126 
C. The Judiciary: "Do Your Bit for Arnerica"127 
• 
The Executive branch specially enlisted lawyers as warriors in the 
War on Drugs. 128 As a consequence, courts were already prepared to 
engage the enemy. The Supreme Court, in particular, has enthusiastically 
• 
· embraced the opportunity to do its bit in the War on Drugs, especially given 
• 
the Court's limited capacity for direct combat operations. At the very least, 
the Court has acted as the enabler for the school drug-warriors in a series of 
cases that have suspended the civil liberties of students in favor ·· of 
advancing the War, 129 not unlike Lincoln's war-time suspension of habeas 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
Hyman et al., supra note 120, at 1. NCLB has taken its own share of the blame for · exacerbating 
school violence problems because of its "overly intense spotlight on academic progress to the 
detriment of attention to social development of young people, which arguably leads to student 
alienation, violence, and tragedy .... Indeed, the testing-focused culture ofNCLB is indicted for 
. 
creating the elements of fear and powerlessness that generate resistance and violence." Jane Clark 
Lindle, School Safety: Real or Imagined Fear?, 22 Eouc. POL'Y 28,37 (2008). 
/d. 
• 
U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROGRAM ASSESSMENT: SAFE AND DRUG fREE SCHOOLS 
STATE GRANTS (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/omb/expectmore/detail/1 0000200.2006.html; see also MCCALLION, supra note 114, at 5 n.l 0 . 
OMB similarly found the SDFSCA state grant programs to be "ineffective" in 2002. /d. 
President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation to the American People (Apr. 16, 1917) (following the 
U.S.'s declaration of war), available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/doyourbit.htm; 
President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Nation (Apr. 16, 1917), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 65399. 
President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies 
(Sept. 9, 1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 36352. 
Not all courts were so sanguine about the necessity of suspending constitutional rights for the War 
on Drugs. One court likened warrantless police searches etnployed in the War as rentiniscent of 
Hitler's Berlin, Stalin's Moscow, and apartheid's South Africa. Bostick v. State, 554 So.2d 1153, 
1158 (Fla. 1989), rev 'd 501 U.S. 429 (1991). "Our Nation, we are told, is engaged in a 'war on 
drugs.' No one disputes that it is the job of law-enforcement officials to devise effective weapons 
for fighting this war. But the effectiveness of a law-enforcentent technique is not proof of its 
constitutionality., /d. at 440 (Marshall, J. dissenting) . 
• 
• 
• 
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. 
corpus. Seduced by the militaristic rhetoric, the Court's words and deeds 
reveal a certain relish in imposing discipline on children who appeal to 
them for protection under the law. 
The irony is that, in the judicial process, the enemy necessarily 
becomes specific and identifiable. No longer is the enemy an elusive drug 
trafficker or some unidentifiable "them," but instead a particular juvenile . 
antagonist against the weight of the governmental entity waging the War. 
Thus, the Supreme Court's arc of suspending the rule of law under ·the 
exigencies of this War first engaged a fourteen-year-old girl in New Jersey 
· v. T.L. 0. 130 until that arc reached its inevitable nadir with the strip-search of 
a thirteen-year-old girl in Safford Unified School District v. Redding}31 
Worse yet, the Court's skirmishes against the enemy started in 1985, before 
the Executive and the Legislature were fully engaged in making schools 
into battlegrounds. But for the Court's willingness to suspend the rule of 
law so early in the War, school officials may not have felt so emboldened to 
voluntaJily enlist. 
It all started with a search-and-seizure case involving a violation of 
school rules. In 1980, a high school teacher in Piscataway, New Jersey, 
discovered two freshman girls smoking in the restroom. 132 When 
confronted by a school administrator, one girl confessed; T.L.O. did not. 133 
. . 
Upon he~ denial that she had violated the school rule, the administrator took 
T.L.O. into his office and requested that she open her.purse, whereupon the 
administrator found cigarettes as well as marijuana and paraphernalia 
rela~ed to both using and dealing rolling papers, a pipe, plastic bags, and a 
list of students who owed money. 134 The administrator turned T.L.O. over 
to the ·police, and the State . brought juvenile charges against her. 135 The 
case pivoted on the legality of the warrantless search of T.L.O.'s purse 
insofar as its contents served as the underlying evidence of delinquency. 
The Court's decision emphatically imposed the restrictions of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments on school districts for student searches: "In 
carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such 
poli~ies, school officials act as representatives of the State, and not merely 
• 
130. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
131. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). In Safford, a school 
• 
administrator authorized the warrantless strip search of a thirteen-year-old female student to 
search for prescription-strength ibuprofen and over-the-counter naproxen, both banned from 
school grounds by school board policy unless the student had pet mission. !d. at 2638. 
132. T.L. 0., 469 U.S. at 328. 
133 !d . 
134. !d. 
135. Id. at 328-29. 
• 
• 
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• 
~ ·surrogates for the parents."136 Hqwever, the flexibility of a school's 
relationship with its students and the swiftness of the need to act in 
disciplinary circumstances allowed for warrantless · searches of students 
under certain circumstances. 137 
The Court framed a school official's prerogative to search as an 
"effective method[] to deal with breaches of public order."138 Howev~r, the 
Court also framed the school official's prerogative as being part and parcel 
of school discipline, that the prerogative relates to the "close supervision of 
schoolchildren."139 In so framing that prerogative, the Court made clear 
that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches 
meant respecting the privacy interests ·of students, or their legitimate 
expectations of privacy,I40 so the Court fotntulated a test for allowing a 
student's warrantless search depending upon the circumstances surrounding 
the search.141 That test entails a two-step analysis of reasonability: First, 
the search has to be justified at its inception and depends upon whether the 
school official had "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will 
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law 
or the rules of the school."142 Second, the scope ~f the search is 
. 
constitutionally acceptable "when the measures adopted [were] reasonably 
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light 
of the age and.sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." 143 
The T.L.O. case was triggered by the school administrator's suspicion 
that the girl had broken a school rule and then evolved into a controlled 
substance issue for a juvenile delinquency proceeding when the police were 
called. Thus, the Court's analysis went beyond the necessity of giving 
school officials the right to proceed for purposes of school ·rules and 
discipline. Instead, the Court gave school officials the right to search on 
. 
suspicion of breaking the law, especially drug laws, and thereby deputized 
school officials to search out student law-breakers while sparing them ''the 
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and 
pennit[ting] them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of 
reason and common sense."144 Whether intended or not, the Court 
conflated law enforcement with school discipline and gave school officials 
an ex~a-institutional capacity to become law enforcement officers while 
136. /d. at 336-37. 
137. /d. at 340. 
138. /d. at 337. 
139. /d. at 339. 
140. !d. at 338. 
141. /d. at 341. 
142. !d. at 342. 
143. /d. 
144. /d. at 343. 
• 
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. 
simultaneously lowering students'. constitutional protections, especially in 
. 
cases involving drugs. By the time the student drug testing cases reached 
the Court, the pump was already primed to allow school officials to 
exercise that huge extension of extra-institutional authority. 
In the meantim~, the War on Drugs . particularly as President George 
H. W. Bush ratcheted up the war rhetoric was becoming a near-obsession 
in some corners of the federal government. Hardly surprising, then, was the 
. 
Supreme Court's employment of similar nearly hysteric rhetoric. For 
• 
instance, when the Custom Service's employee drug-testing program was 
challenged by the employees' union, the CoUrt majority relied on hortatory 
language in its favor: 
The Customs Service is our Nation's first line of defense against one of 
the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population. 
We ·have adverted before to ''the veritable national crisis in law 
enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics." ... This national 
interest in self-protection coul~ be irreparably damaged if those charged 
with safeguarding it were, because of their own drug use, unsympathetic 
. to their niission of interdicting narcotics. 145 
The Court ha4 not far to travel to rely on these exigencies of war to suspend 
children's civil. rights in service to those exigencies. · 
. 
The genesis of the Vernonia community's and · school's decision to 
mandate urinalysis on its student-athlet~s was its "drug problem."146 
Discipline problems in the schools were attributed both to drug use and to a 
systemic acceptance ·of the drug culture among ~tudents, especially the 
athletes. All evidence pointed to the school district's attempting to solve 
the problem itself; there is no mention of referring students to the police or 
145. Nat'l Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668, 670 (1990). Justice Scalia, 
dissenting in Von Raab, described these invocations of national disaster as insufficient to support 
the employee drug testing in the Customs Service. ld. at 682. Similar "reasoning" was used to 
uphold highway sobriety checkpoints in Michigan Dep 't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 
(1990). In the face of evidence in the record that such checkpoints are ineffective, the majority 
relied on similarly purple prose as the Von Raab court: 
No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the 
States' interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation 
on the Nation's roads are legion. The anecdotal is confinned by the 
statistical. ... "The increasing slaughter on our highways ... now reaches the 
astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield." · 
ld. at 449, 451. The Court eventually dete1mined that a 1.6% arrest rate was sufficient empirical 
evidence to deem the program effective. ld. at 455. Arrest rates, however, were not the state's 
interest; curbing drunk driving was. Id. at 449. The state had presented no evidence of the latter. 
See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (state failed to show any significant 
contribution to highway safety by having license and registration checkpoints). 
146. Ve1nonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1995) . 
• 
• 
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the juvenile .authorities: Instead, the · co~unity apparently tasked the 
school district with fixing the "problem." 147 The school district chose 
warrantless drug testing on all its athletes as the solution to that problem. 148 
A seventh-grade student who wanted to try out for football challenged the 
school district's policy!49 He lost.150 
The Court did not treat these searches as being procedures arising 
from suspicions of violating either a school rule or the law, but instead as 
"custodial and tutelary." 151 These were searches "undertaken for 
prophylactic and distinctly nonpunitive purposes (protecting student 
athletes from injury, and deterring drug use in the student population)."152 
Indeed, the test results were to be kept in-house without referral to law 
enforcement; however, a punitive aspect did exist: students who tested 
positive were suspended from athletic participation. 153 In any event, these 
"custodial and tutelary" searches were part and parcel of the War on Drugs: 
"Deterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is at least as important 
as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the 
importation of drugs."154 The weakest citizens were entitled to protection 
from that War because "the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the 
. fact that this evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon 
children for whom it has undertaken a special responsibility of care and 
direction."155 Because these searches were for "protection" only, school. 
officials no longer needed even a reasonable suspicion of drug use at all. 
To rule otherwise, according to the Court; would add "to the ever-
expanding diversionary duties of schoolteachers the new function of 
• 
14 7. /d. The evidence was undisputed that the local high school was experiencing a serious discipline 
problem attributable to a combination of drugs and alcohol with their glamorization by student-
athletes lionized by a community with limited entertainment options. Acton v. V etnonia School 
Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (D. Ore. 1992). "The coincidence of an almost three-fold 
increase in classroom disruptions and disciplinary reports along with the staff's direct 
observations of students using drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration to 
the inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well 
as the student[s'] misperceptions about the drug culture." /d. at 1357. Although the 
administration had considered mass expulsion, the opinions reveal no evidence that law 
enforcement was engaged. Urinalysis was considered a "less drastic alternative" to other 
disciplinary measures. /d. at 1358. 
148. Id. The empirical evidence shows that student drug-testing is an ineffective method for curbing 
drug use and, in some cases, may increase student drug use, See generally Susan Stuart, When the 
Cure is Worse than the Disease: Student Random Drug Testing & Its Empirical Failure, 44 VAL . 
U. L. REV. 1055 (2010). 
149 Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 651. 
150 /d. 
151. /d. at 656. 
152. /d. at 658 n.2 (ernphasis in original). 
153. /d. at 651. 
154. /d. at 661. 
155. /d. at 662. 
• 
• 
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spotting and bringing to account drug abuse, a task for which they are ill 
prepared, and which is not readily compatible with their vocation." 156 
Insofar as the Vernonia community agreed with the school district's 
po}icy,157 the local CitizenS Were COmplicit in reducing their Children'S CiVil 
rights in exchange for outsourcing an essentially law enforcemen~ function 
to the schools. 158 
Then the Court was faced with a challenge to a urinalysis policy in a 
.school district without a distinguishable drug problem but in which all 
· students who engaged in extracurricular activities not just athletes were 
subject to random drug-testing. 159 The Court no longer needed to posit any 
· other justification for these tests than the special needs of the school 
environment, 160 but the Court characterized those "special needs" in a way 
that suggests it was supporting the school district's War effort. Indeed, the 
Court's analysis of the state interest sufficient to justify the intrusion on the 
students' Fourth Amendment privacy interests was significantly juxtaposed 
in the context of the War: "The drug abuse problem among our Nation's 
youth has hardly abated since Vernonia: was decided in 1995. In fact, 
evidence suggests that it has only grown worse .... Indeed, the nationwide 
• • 
·drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a · pressing concern in every 
school."161 
· Perhaps nowhere did Court so completely embrace its mission in the 
War on Drugs a~d face such a forinidable juvenile enemy ·as in Morse · v. 
Frederick.162 · In that case, a principal disciplined a high school student who 
erected a banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" while television crews 
followed the Olympic Torch Relay through Juneau, Alaska.163 In the face 
• 
of the student's challenge under the First Amendment, the Court carved out 
. 
156. /d. at 664. 
157. /d. at 665. 
158. A follow-up to assess the Vernonia school policy's success yielded only vague statements that 
drug use seemed to decrease and discipline seemed to improve. Ryoko Yamaguchi, Lloyd D. 
Johnston, & Patrick M. O'Malley, Youth, Educ. & Soc'y, YES Occasional Papers No.2: Drug 
• 
Testing in Schools: Policies, Practices. and Association with Student Drug Use 1 (2003) 
[hereinafter Yamaguchi Yes]. 
159. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 
(2002). 
160. /d. at 829. 
161. /d. at 834. This theme played out similarly in Justice Thomas's dissent in Safford Unified School 
District #I, where he quoted this passage in Earls as the rule of law, rather than merely a piece of 
"evidence." Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct.. 2633, 2657 (2009). 
Thomas thereby converted a piece of evidence into a legal presumption of the state's interest, 
virtually eliminating the state's burden of proof and preordaining the loss of students' 
constitutional rights. 
162. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
163. /d. at 397. 
• 
• 
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. 
an exception to students' freedom of speech· for messages that advocate 
illegal drug use. 164 Regardless of whether or not this banner was a message 
that actually advocated illegal drug use rather than adolescent gibberish 
designed to attract the attention of television cameras, the Court apparently 
. believed that this speech was disruptive and that it impennissibly interfered 
with the school's educational function.165 To reach that conclusion, the 
. Court extrapolated the content of the speech as the disruption and 
. 
impennissible interference, rather .than the manner and location of the 
speech. The Court was offended by the drug-related nature of the speech 
rather than by any actual impact it had on the educational function. By· 
making that leap, the Court stood shoulder-to-shoulder with other drug 
warriors to assist school officials who were mandated to engage in certain 
. 
combat tactics by the government in the War on Drugs: 
The problem remains serious today ... :Congress has declared that part of 
a school's job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use . 
. 
It has provided billions of dollars to support state and local drug-. 
prevention programs ... and required that schools receiving federal funds 
under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 
certify that their drug-prevention programs ·"convey a clear and consistent 
. 
message that . .. the illegal use of drugs [is] wrong and 
harmful." ... Thousands of school boards throughout the country-
including JDHS have adopted policies aimed at · effectuating this 
. 
message .... Those school boards kno\v that peer pressure is perhaps "the 
single most imp~rtant factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs," and 
that students are more likely to use drugs when the norms in school appear 
to tolerate such behavior .. · .. Student speech celebrating illegal drug use 
. 
at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers, 
thus poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect 
those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse. 166 
. 
The Court delivered quite a blow to student civil rights with that 
decision, choosing to suspend the Constitution in service to the War on 
. 
Drugs. No one had told · the Justices that these combat tactics have no 
measurable success. 167 But at least the Court had early identified a specific 
enemy in the War on Drugs, and a formidable enemy it has proved to be. 
164. !d. at 403. 
165. ld. at 401,405,408. 
166. !d. at 407-08 (citations omitted). 
167. The U.S "government has spent $33 Billion in marketing 'Just Say No' -style messages to 
America's youth and other prevention programs. High school students report the same rates of 
illegal drug use as they did in 1970, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says drug 
overdoses have 'risen steadily' since the early 1970s to more than 20,000" in 2009. Martha 
• 
• 
. 
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N. THE OUTSIDERS168 
The insidious problem with a war on an intangible or abstract concept 
is identifying the enemy.169 As the War on Drugs progressed from the 
Nixon presidency to today, identifying a specific enemy on whom to 
declare War proved rather elusive, especially · if the · public were to be 
engaged in combat with an enemy that threatened the nation. A nation 
cannot engage with plants and pharmac~uticals. In concretizing that 
abstraction, the enemy was caricatured in different ways, depending up-on 
the political or social framing of the War. But even from the outset, the 
War was caricaturized as an "us-versus-them" phenomenon. The targets 
may change, but the cause remained the same: The nation was being 
threatened by "them." The problem with that framing is that students are 
both "us" and "them." 
Otherness pervaded early drug control efforts in the U.S., usually due 
to racism. 170 Thus, early goverrunent anti-drug efforts stigmatized drug use 
by playing on ·racial characteristics and stereotypes: opium use was 
negatively ()Ssociated with the Chinese171 while cocaine17~ and marijuana 
use was negatively associated with African-Americans and Mexicans, 173 
implying that '~real" Americans were being threatened by outsi4ers. Thus, 
prohibiting opium use was but one of several weapons to· ~arginalize 
Chinese immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as 
• 
. . 
Mendoza, U.S. Drog War Has Met None of Its Goals, MSNBC.COM, 
http://www .msnbc.msn.com/id/3 7134 7 51/ns/us _news-security/ (last updated May 13, 201 0). 
168. S.E. HINTON, THE OUTSIDERS (Viking 2007). S.E. Hinton's best-selling and award-winning 
young adult novel focused on the violent conflict between the Socials and the Greasers, but 
particularly focused on the social alienation of the Greasers: "It was too vast a problem to be just a 
personal thing." ·ld. at 187; see also Dale Peck, 'The Outsiders': 40 Years Later, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Sept. 23, 2007, http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2007 /09/23/books/review/Peck -t.html. 
169. "Insofar as the war[) on ... drugs [is] treated as [a war] on conditions, [it], like the wars on cancer 
and (in general) poverty must, of course, be seen as wholly metaphorical, for one cannot, of 
course, declare a literal war on a condition." Jeremy E~ins, The Model of War, 38 POL. THEORY 
214, 227 (2010); "Anything waged against a shapeless, intangible noun can never truly be won." 
Suddath, supra note 77. · 
170. MORONE, supra note 14, at 464--65. 
171. GLASSNER, supra note 24, at 135. 
172. "In 1914, The New York Times reported that cocaine caused blacks to commit 'violent crimes,' 
and that it made them resistant to police bullets." Mendoza, supra note 167; MORONE, supra 
notel4, at 465. . 
173. ERNEST L. ABEL, MARUUANA: THE FIRST TwELVE 'fiiOUSAND YEARS 217-22 (1980), available 
at http://www.druglibrary.org/Schafferlhemplhistory/firstl2000/12.htm. The higher penalties for 
crack use than for powder cocaine u~e have also led to higher arrests rates of African-Americans, 
whose communities tend to favor crack. Gary Fields, White House Czar Calls for End to "War 
on Drugs," WALL Sr. J., May 14, 2009, at A3, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124224891527617 397.html. 
. . 
• 
• 
• 
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they competed, quite successfully, with white Americans in the economy. 174 
Jim Crow laws presaged attacks on African-Americans' cocaine use while 
the Great pepression saw an increasingly hysterical connection between 
marijuana use and Mexicans.175 Any number of social, cultural, nativistic, 
or perhaps tribal impulses could be to blame although the actual source is 
likely as simple as the founding Puritan notion that we can only define 
ourselves as U .. S. citizens by contrasting ourselves with those who we are 
not.176 But the approach to attributing drug abuse., and therefore bad 
. . 
behavior, to "others" runs long and deep. President Nixon mined those 
impulses when he launched the War on Drugs. 
Nixon's job was to persuade the country to cooperate in his efforts to 
fight drug abuse. His job was complicated by the fact that recreational drug 
use had gone mainstream. Young people discovered marijuana does not 
have the deleterious effects177 that had so thoroughly terrified their parents: 
They would not die, become pregnant, or go insane.178 An abstract message 
to the country that drug use had health consequences and a significant. 
impact on crime, while true, did not have high marketing value. Nor did a 
message '?f morality: . Such a message had not worked out so well during 
the Prohibition, and similar tactics have been a disaster for teen sexual 
activity. In addition, Nixon was in the midst of trying to end the Vietnam 
War as favorably as possible, especially in the face of the rising anti-war 
movement So Nixon conjoined them.179 · 
President Nixon discovered that he-could move the body politic to 
action if he associated this explosion in drug use with the anti-war protest 
movement. If Nixon could marginalize the~e users many of whom were 
teenagers and could not vote yet then he could recruit allies in the "silent 
• 
majority" who remained afraid and abstinent. Nixon consciously linked the 
drug problem in the U.S. with Vietnam i~selt: indeed with the fate of the 
Nation: "When I look at the history of great civilizations in the past, many 
of them have gone down this road and they slip into basically the drug 
psychology, the drug society; it is terribly destructive of the character of 
174. 
175. 
176. 
177. 
178. 
179. 
SZASZ, supra note 10, at 75-80. 
MORONE, supra note 14, at 46~6 . 
MORONE, supra note 14 at 54, 55-59. 
Musto, supra note 11. 
Reefer Madness is_ perhaps the most easily derided of the religious prohibitionists' efforts to make 
. . 
children "Just Say No." The film was intended as a morality tale entitled Tell Your Children. 
While "addicted" to marijuana, the film's characters die, become sexually promiscuous, and go 
insane. Kevin Murphy & Dan Studney, Reefer Madness History, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20060328163318/http:/Lwww .reefer-madness-movie.comlhistory.html. Modem teenagers 
laughed and made the movie a cult hit 
Mendoza, s1.1pra note 167. • 
• 
• 
• 
. 
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. 
that nation."180. Blaming· some of the problems in Vietnam itself on the 
drug-addled condition of the servicemen was also convenient.181 Nixon's 
marginalization of GI heroin users alternatively framed the problem as a 
"drugs-as-disease metaphor," the contagion of which threatened national 
security.182 He thereby constructed an identity of the "other" who was to 
blame for the U.S.'s drug problem as well as its foreign policy problems, an 
identity of an "other" that was un-American and could not be tolerated.183 
. 
This "other" also fit well into Nixon's stabbed-in-the-back narrative for the 
failures in Vietnam. 184 Perhaps just as significantly, it fit well into a quasi-
religious assault on the legacy of the 1960s, during which niinorities, 
women, the poor, and the elderly "others" won significant civil rights.185 
President Reagan, in particular, perpetuated Nixon's ''us-versus-them" 
paradigm of the War but made it a political as well as national security 
statement by tagging "them" as liberals and hippies out to destroy America. 
He was in the vanguard of those wanting to roll back civil rights success, so 
he blamed the era and reached back to blame the youth of the 1960s for 
perpetuating his own presidency's drug problems in the I 980s: 
. 
We know there are a large number of individuals, primarily those who 
acquired their drug-use habits in the sixties and seventies, who persist in 
• 
using illegal drugs. And this persistent demand for illegal drugs is met by 
sometimes seemingly limitless supply. But a $urge in drug-related crimes, 
• • 
180. President Richard Nixon, Remarks at a White House Conference on Drug Abuse (Oct. 14, 1970), 
available at http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php?pid=2719. . 
181. JEREMY KUZMAROV, THE MYTH OF THE ADDICTED ARMY: VIETNAM AND THE MODERN WAR ON 
DRUGS 6 (2009). "The myth of the addicted army ... helped to skew public memory of the 
Vietnam War by advancing the impression that pure and innocent American youth had been 
corrupted by illegal drugs not by flawed policies, institutional failings, or cultural chauvinism, 
as most historians would conclude." /d. President Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew 
similarly attempted to ascribe the failure in the Vietnam War on the insidious effect anti-war 
activists had on returning servicemen by spitting on them. That myth persists to this day, despite 
the absence of evidence that any such incidents occurred. JERRY LEMBCKE, THE SPn"I'ING IMAGE: 
• 
MYTH, MEMORY AND THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM 71-76 (1998); see also KUZMAROV, supra, at 7. 
Nixon and Agnew were marketing masters. 
182. Daniel Weimer, Drugs-as-a-Disease: Heroin. Metaphors, and Jqentity in Nixon's Drug War, 6 
JANUS HEAD 260,262 (2003), available at www.janushead.org/6-2/Wiemer.pdf. 
183. !d. at 265. "Ensconced in a culture of fear, the public was falsely imbued with the impression that 
America's social fabric was being tom apart at the seams by half-crazed and doped-up soldiers 
from whom nobody was safe." Jeremy Kuzrnarov, From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-
Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drogs, 20 J. OF POL'YHIST. 344, 348 (2008). 
184. Kevin Baker, Stabbed in the Back! The Past and Future of a Right-Wing Myth, HARPER'S 
BAZAAR, June 2006, www.harpers.org/archive/2006/06/0081 080. 
185. MORONE, supra note 14, at 445, 452. "The assault on the sixties has succeeded 
brilliantly .... [B]ut at its height, men and women stood up courageously for the American 
dream •... The movement's victories America's democratic legacies~me at great sacrifice 
and with enormous courage." /d. at 445. 
• 
• 
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deaths by overdose, births of drug-addicted and drug-impaired babies, and 
even the destabilization of national governments by traffickers should not 
be viewed as harbingers of defeat in our war on drugs. These events 
should instead strengthen our resolve to stop this insidious evil once and 
for all. 186 
• 
33 
Reagan thereby characterized "us" as ''America," and exhorted that no less 
than our constitutional integrity d~manded that the War on Drugs be a 
necessary war: 
• 
So, this is my message to you today: to hold the torch high, to stay in the 
battle. Too much is left to do. The battle is far from over. And all is yet 
to win or lose. But we stand with the founders of our nation in this 
ongoing struggle to protect our freedom. Thomas Jefferson reminded us 
that "Our pec':lliar security is in the possession of a written Constitution." 
And he implored, "Let us not make it a blank paper by construction." For 
as James Madison wrote, if" ... the sense in which the Constitution was 
accepted and ratified by the Nation is not the guide to expounding 
it ... there can be no security for a faithful exercise of its powers." It was 
true then. It is true ·now. It will be true always. 187 
• 
President .Reagan clearly had not gotten the message that drug use crosses 
politicallines.188 
Thus, the early political bandwagon to drum up support for the War 
on Drugs was "us" (real Americans) against some vague "them,'' typically 
political, racial or cultural outsiders.189 For Nixon, the enemies were 
African-Americans, the political left, and hippies. For Reagan, the War 
focused on the racial underclass whereas President George H.W. Bush's 
War took on a moralistic view that waged battle on those who were "more 
dependent, less fulfilled, lacking in 'social currency,' as well as those who 
do not accept the model of sober autonomy on which 'our nation's notion 
of liberty is rooted.'"190 "Real" Americans were not only recruited to 
combat the enemies, they were to be protected from these enemies. 
Middle-class users were considered benign or even victims of the aggressor 
186. Remarks to Media Executives at a White House Briefing on Drug Abuse, supra note 35. See also 
Remarks to the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, supra note 128 (''The 
liberals have scoffed when rve said we're winning the war on drugs."). 
187. Remarks to the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, supra note 128. 
188. Politicians' Children's Encounters with Marijuana Prohibition, NAT'L ORG. FOR REFORM OF 
MARUUANA LAWS (July 6, 2000), http://norml.org/pdf_files/NORML_politicians_childrens_ 
arrests. pdf; Tokin' Politics, NAT'L ORO. FOR REFORM OF MARUUANA LAWS, 
http://norml.org/index.cfin?Group_ID=3461 (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
189. Elkins, supra note 166, at 224. 
190. /d. at 226. 
.. 
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outsiders!91 , ·Thus, N~ncy Reag~n's Just Say· No clubs were especialiy 
designed to target white, middle-class children.192 
The patriotic fervor in waging the War of Drugs received a huge boost 
after the attacks of September 11. Regardless .of whether terrorist groups 
have been. funded solely by illegal drug trafficking193. or perhaps even 
· partially financed by U.S. drug policy itself,194 the connection became the 
official government meme because· of the attacks on the World Trade 
' ' 
Center. The DEA called it Narco-Terrorism.195 Indeed, the DEA 
Adtninistrator, Asa Hutchinson, described September II as a great 
marketing tool in theW~ on Drugs:· 
This is a great opportunity for us to focus our country on the extraordinary 
connection between drugs and terrorism. When President Bush asked me 
to head up the DEA about 3 months ago, after I was confirtned, I did not 
anticipate that the events of September 11, of course, would even occur, 
but how it would significantly change the viewpoint of America and the 
. 
attitude. of our country toward· drugs and how it would shape America's 
view of our nation's fight against drugs. 196 
Perhaps more insidious, however, was the political coupling of adolescent 
drug use in the U.S. to terrorism: · · 
. ' 
.. 
. . 
Now. we potenti~lly are going to see, much like I had mentioned, if a 
· student does illegal activity and illegal smoking as a teenager at sch9ol, 
· 191. /d. at 226. At the height of the War,. one drug warrior suggested that recreational drug users 
should be shot as traitors. !d. at 227. 
192. Frontline Chronology, supra note 18. 
193. Sheldon Richman, The Drug War and Terrorism, FREEDOM DAILY (Jan. 2002), 
www.fff.org/freedom/fd020 ld.asp. 
It has long been known that violent groups in Latin America have-made money by 
protecting coca farmers from government agents, both American and indigenous. It 
. . 
should come as no surprise to learn that the same happens in Central Asia and the 
Middle East. It is certainly no surprise to the American authorities. They paid the 
Taliban in Afghanistan millions of dollars before September 11 to stem the growing of 
poppies for heroin. The Taliban is reported to have obliged; but the lost heroin is 
reported to have been made up by the Northern Alliance, the U.S. government's new 
allies. 
Id. See also Kevin B. Zeese, Drug Terror Link Shows Sloppy Thinking of Drug War Advocates, 
NAACOTERROR.ORG, www.narcoterr,or.org/kzoped0202~htrn (last updated July 16, 2009) . 
• 
194~ Richman, supra note 193. 
195. Steven W. Casteel, Assistant for Intelligence, U.S. Dep't. of Just., Drug Enforcement Admin., 
Testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Narco-Terrorism (May 20; 
2003 ), available at http://www .justice.gov/dealpubslcngrtest/ ct052003 .htinl. 
196. Asa Hutchison, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency, Remarks During a National 
Symposium on Narco-Terrorism Entitled Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists & Your Kids 
(Dec. 4, 2001 ), available at http://www. targetamerica.orgldownloads/symposium _transcript. pdf . 
• 
• 
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. 
· · · that he is likely ·to do iJlt~gal alcohol, and if he starts to do that, .he's going 
to be exposed to other illegal activities. Our big concern in this area is 
we're going to see the interconnectedness of international terrorist 
organizations. 197 
35 
The implications of this coupling are rather horrifying, that our children are 
terrorists if they abuse drugs. 
In absorbing this militaristic marketing strategy, schools ar~ not 
entirely to blame. At the very least, qualifying for federal and state funds to 
deal with the problems required them tQ ·do so. More culpably, school 
officials could consider themselves part of a greater national security event, 
especially with the support of the Supreme Court cases; simplistic legal 
principles espoused by the Court are easier to apply than to reconsider them 
in the context of education theory and policy. 198 But schools should have 
known better than to make students the enemy. The educational dynamic 
between educators and adolescents is always "us-versus-them." Teens 
always view themselves as the "others." They pride themselves on that 
identification as ·a rite of passage to adulthood. When schools began 
actively targeting their students as the enemy in the War on Drugs, they 
militarized the conflict unnecessarily. The irony is-that, after all is said and 
done, schools have nothing positive to show for . that characterization: no 
significant reduction in drug use in the schools, no trust between school 
administrators and their charges, and no civil rights for students. 
V. LORD OF THE FLIES199 
The War on Drugs' marketing strategy through militarized rhetoric 
worked. All branches of govenunent sold the emotional message by 
incessant repetition, and the public with little self-reflection bought the 
~litarization of the message as the means to an end: If we treat this effort 
as a War, then the drug problem will disappear. We did not stop to 
consider that the abstract would have to be made real, that we would be 
declaring war on their children as among "others," including terrorists. 
197. Former Congressman Mark Souder, Remarks During a National Symposium on Narco-Terrorism 
Entitled Target America: Traffickers, Tenorists & Your Kids (Dec. 4, 2001 ), available at 
http://www. targetamerica.org/downloadslsymposium_ transcript. pdf. 
198. See, e.g., Robert G. Fraser, Student Discipline from the Perspective of the School Attorney, 34 
NEW ENG. L. REv. 573 (1999-2000). 
199. WILLIAM GoLDING, LoRD OF THE FLIES (A Perigee Book 2003). Another influential novel that is 
often taught in high school classes, Lord of the Flies is set in war-time when a group of British 
school-boys is stranded on an island. It is, ultimately, about democracy and dictatorship. Jd. at ix 
(Introduction by E.M. Forster). Golding himself describes the following theme: "The moral is 
that the shape of a society must depend on the ethical nature of the individual and not on any 
political system however apparently logical or respectable." /d. at 290. 
• 
• 
• 
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. Hence, the marketing strategy shifted from the metaphorical · to the literal 
and sustained the War on Drugs for forty years. It persuaded Congress and 
state legisla~es to disgorge billions of dollars for worthless campaigns and 
useless annament. It persuaded courts to curtail the rights of students 
because we were at war. And, oh so tragically, that war first targeted our 
servicemen in Vietnam, many of whom are still struggling today under the 
stigma of being failures as warriors in a very real war, with very re~l bodies 
and very real trauma. 
After forty years, perhaps facts and conunon sense have won out: the 
. 
Obama Presidency is trying to address the nation's drug problems through 
prevention and treatment. The National Drug Control Strategy 2010 is 
focusing on small steps to change the War into a public health issue.200 But 
where one War ends, another War is sure to· follow: War abhors a 
vacuum.201 And that axiom leads to the current conundrum . 
• 
The rhetorical excesses of the War on Drugs are continuing, but now 
we are iricreasingly comfortable with the metaphorical becoming literal. 
The militarized rhetoric that pundits and politicians are using includes the 
same expli~it words and images used during the War on Drugs, and they are 
whipping up a frenzy using the same paradigm: This health and social 
problem is a war of"us-versus-them." Presidents Nixon,_ Reagan, and H.W. 
Bush were wildly successful at marketing the War on Drugs as an "us-
• . 
against~them" proposition, neglecting to mention, of co:urse, that "us" had 
the same drug problems as "them."202 But the point ·of that rhetoric in the 
War on Drugs was to market a product and recruit soldiers. The War may 
. 
have been misbegotten, but it started with a l~gitimate enemy, drug abuse. 
At the outset, "us-versus-them" militarize_d rhetoric was the pathos, but it' 
was not the logos. By mid-war, however, the federal government had used 
the powerful engine of our rule of law to identify children as the enemy. 
Today, the militarized rhetoric has skipped the abstraction and 
individualized the enemy each other without a moral reason in sight for 
• 
doing so. 
200. THE WHITE HOUSE, NAT'L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2010 (May 2010), available at 
• 
http://www. whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-researchlndcs20 10 _ 0. pdf. 
Furthermore, the new proposal for ESEA's reauthorization still includes drug-free schools 
provisions but emphasizes safe, successful and healthy students rather than law enforcement. 
U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT (2010), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leglbluprintlblueprint.pdf. 
201. HEDGES, supra note 8, at 14. 
202. See, e.g., Jay P. Greene & Greg Forster, Sex, Drogs, and Delinquency in Urban and Suburban 
Public Schools (Manhattan Inst. Educ., Working Paper, 2004), available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/htmVewp _ 04.htm. 
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The United States h·as a long history of manipulating "othemes~,,· as a 
way of creating unity, especially of the ruling majority. ''The goal of 
such ... rhetoric is to invoke pity for one's own. The goal is to show the 
community that what they hold sacred is under threat. The enemy, we are 
told, seeks to destroy religious and cultural life, the very identity of the 
group or state."203 Similarly did Hannah Arendt explain of totalitarianism: 
''The principle of the movement is whoever is not included is excluded, 
whoever is not with me is against .me, so the world loses all the nuances and 
pluralistic aspects that have become too confusing for the masses."204 So, 
today, "us, is engaged in a war with "them." 
This ''civil" war has been denominated the Culture War. It is a war 
being "fought to defeat one's cultural enemies."205 Although pundits and. 
politicians may insist that this characterization of the social dispute is a 
mere abstraction for which war as metaphor is acceptably employed, a 
Culture War seeks· the destruction of its opponents. This is war for war's 
sake: "[Q]ulture war rhetoric is aimed not at offering an effective proof for 
the benefit of the opposition, but in destroying the opposition. Because 
proof is not its aim or its concern~ culture war rhetoric has no· allegiance to 
the truth."206 This battle is no longer a war on an abstraction because 
pundit~ and politicians have learned, through the War on Drugs experience, 
that the audience will accept, condone, and encourage the metamorphosis of 
a metaphorical war on an abstraction to a literal one t~at harms our "real" 
enemies. If; we would do this to children, we can certainly do it to adults. 
The politicians' and pundits' response· to such criticism is that the 
Culture War rhetoric· has not actually crossed the line: "We did not mean 
that; the listener must have misunderstood; or the listener was mentally 
• 
unstable." But the listener did not misunderstand; the listener believed 
because he or she was immune to the subtleties that the politicians and 
pundits assert after· the fact. If politicians' rhetoric is militaristic, the 
natural impulse in the United States is to take up arms. Past rhetorical 
excesses have made the listener unable to discern that current rhetoric does 
not ~ean exactly what the politicians and pundits say: Today's language of 
war no longer carries an implied message not to act. No longer does a 
metaphorical filter to the direct words of battle exist, and America's past 
experience in the W·ar on Drugs has inured people from reflecting on the 
morality of those words . 
.. 
203. HEDGES, supra note 8, at 15. 
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205. Kyle R. Cupp, Culture War Rhetoric, Vox NOVA (Feb. 14, 2011), http://vox-
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The War on Drugs, among other "just" wars of public policy, has 
deafened citizens to the ethical uses of war as metaphor: "In debating 
social policy through the language of war, we often forget the moral reality 
of war."207 One of those moral realities is that a war requires justification. 
"[A] moral presumption against war [exists] because of the important 
individual and social duty not to kill others." 208_ But when exhorted into-
war, today's civilian can no longer discern the distinction between a 
metaphorical war in ~hich he might engage and a literal war for which 
should not. Nor do today's civilians understand the "formalities" of war . 
. ·They do not understand that "[o]rganized killing .. :. [is] done best by a 
disciplined, professional anny."209 Today's civilians have not incorporated 
the moral imperative that the just warrior is to "[e]riter reluctantly, fight 
fairly, and restore the peace as soon as possible."210 Instead, a Culture War 
imbues the warrior with a "dangerous mentality of crusade or holy 
war ... that right' makes might of any kind acceptable[,] ... neglect[ing] 
such constraints as right intention, discrimination, · and proportionality, 
which protect the humanity of all parties in war. "211 The oh-so~successful 
marketing tactics that Nixon started,. that Reagan. ene~gized, and that the 
Bushes sent into the stratosphere to support a Forty-Years War are now 
employed with little or no self-reflection, and certainly no justification nor 
ethical consideration. 212 · 
Because of that lack of self-reflection on the use of war rhetoric in the 
. . 
Culture War, we trivialize both actual war and the source of that War: the 
debate about America's national identity.213 War rhetoric does not engage 
the debate; it inhibits the debate. "The metaphor of warfare highlights the 
conflict involved in argument, but it hides the cooperation and 
collaboration, involving shared rules, that are also indispensable to 
argument."214 This fact holds especially true if either side of the "debate" 
has no proof to establish the rightness of its position. Instead, the 
militarized rhetoric simply solidifies and magnifies the pathos but not the 
logos, because no logos exists. · 
Instead of civilized debate, we simply have militarized rhetoric that is 
not designed to inform but to inflame, because "us" must out-recruit "them" 
to prevaiL "Us" must recruit members because "us" wants "to grow 
207. Childress, supra note 3, at 181. 
208. /d. at 182. 
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209. HEDGES, supra note 8, at 9. 
210. Childress, supra note 3, at 183. 
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indefinitely and what it needs for this is more and more people."215 
Inflammatory, militarized rhetoric is particularly useful in recruiting 
because anger is an important attribute in the taking of sides: 
One of the most striking traits of the inner life of a crowd is the feeling of 
being persecuted, a peculiar angry sensitiveness and irritability directed 
• 
against those it has once and forever nominated as enemies. These can 
behave in any manner, harsh or conciliatory, cold or sympathetic, severe 
or mild whatever they do will be interpreted as springing from an 
unshakable malevolence, a premeditated intention to destroy the crowd, 
openly or by stealth.216 
Worse, the crowd destroys civil society; it loves destruction for the 
sake of its growth and even for its raison d,etre: 
• 
• 
• 
The destructiveness of the crowd is often mentioned as its most 
conspicuous quality . . . . The crowd particularly likes . destroying houses 
and objects: breakable objects like window panes, mirrors, pictures and 
crockery; and people tend to think that it is the fragility of these objects 
which stimulates the destructiveness of the crowd.217 
. 
When war, and not just destruction, is its organizing principle, the crowd 
can erupt into actual war: · · 
War is an astonishing business. People decide that they are threatened 
with physical destruction and proclaim the fact publicly to the whole 
world. They say 'I can be killed', and secretly add 'because I myself want 
to kill this or that man.' ... Even if in fact the aggressor, each side will 
always attempt to prove that it is threatened. 218 
• 
• 
Sadly, metaphorical war is successful in the United States because 
· "[w]ar makes the world understandable, a black and white tableau of them 
and us. It suspends thought, especially self-critical thought. All bow 
before the supreme effort. We are one."219 ·1n addition to a modem identity 
that accepts war because we are no longer sensitive to its images, we 
become desensitized to its moral problems. War becomes trivial rather than 
215. ELIAS CANEITI, CROWDS AND POWER, 20 (Carol Stewart trans., The Noonday Press 1984). 
216. !d. at 22. "In order to understand this feeling of hostility and persecution it is necessary to start 
from the basic fact that the crowd, once fotmed, wants to grow rapidly. It is difficult to 
exaggerate the power and detet ruination with which it spreads." /d. at 23. 
217. /d. at 19. 
218. Jd. at 71-72. 
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exceptional.220 "Once we _sign on for war's crusade, once we ~ee oUrselves 
on the side of the angels, once we embrace a theological or ideological 
belief system that defmes itself as the embodiment of goodness and light, it 
is only a matter of how we will carry out murder."221 As the fable of The 
Lord of the Flies implies, ~an may be ineluctably drawn to savagery 
because he "loves adventure, excitement, foraging in groups, ... and · he 
loves shedding blood."222 With our failure to confront the moral problems 
of the Culture War and allowing it to become literal, we are no longer .the 
moral force that can restrain those naturally inclined to violence. 223 · 
One of the most tragic consequences .of the goverr101ent's assault on 
children in the War on Drugs is what it has done to the institution that 
might otherwise teach the moral lessons about war. When schools became 
the battleground, Congress and the Court used the rule of law to turn 
schools from institutions that should teach students about their role in 
democracy to institutions that teach students to be passive observers in the 
loss of their constitutional rights. Marketing messages are hard to rid 
oneself of, like those little tunes or advertising jingles earworms-that we 
' just cannot seem to get out of our heads. We remember those and embrace 
them without otherwise thinking about their factual basis. Marketing 
messages also require a comtnitment to the message: That cotttmitment 
. 
was wholly embraced in schools with certain regiqnal, religious, and 
authoritarian attitudes, not unlike those that have enlisted in the Culture 
' 
War. Thus, certain school ·districts have wholly favored this war effort over 
the educational fate of their students, and they have communicated to their 
students that schools are not to be trusted bu~ that their greatest asset is to 
be feared. Long-term, schoolchildren hear the message that principles of 
democracy do not apply to them, a message conutlunicated by the 
. 
institution that has long been entrusted with teaching those principles. The 
past three or four generations of schoolchildren have heard the following 
message from schools: your rights as citizens are not nearly as important as 
our war efforts. Militarized rhetoric transformed a war against an 
abstraction into a war against actual chlldren and the very survival of 
America's rule of law in time of war. Nearly as bad are those students who 
have accepted their substand~d status. After all, they are warriors. And 
220. 
221. 
222. 
223. 
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HEDGES, supra note 8, at 9. 
GOLDING, supra note 199, at ix. 
See, e.g., HEDGES, supra note 8, at 84, 87. 
• 
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around with car trunks full of weapons they did not know how to use. They killed and tortured 
according to whims and moods." ld. at 105~ 
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War is hell.224 Equally as bad is the prospect that, by internalizing 
metaphorical war as a legitimate mechanism for discourse and for resolving 
disputes, children are actually teaming_ to perpetuate war. Jack, Piggy, and 
Ralph were just children, but they had to forrn their own society: one 
represented democracy; the other anarchy.225 In the absence of any other 
guidance, a pig's head on a stick makes as much sense as· a totem of 
civilization for children as what occurred to them in the War on Drugs. 
Last, the· War on Drugs taught Americans that even metaphorical 
militarization will adversely affect the rule of law. As is becoming 
increasingly apparent, legislatUres all over the country are passing laws to 
·align with the rhetoric, laws that will affect ''them" and not "us." Hence, 
Arizona feels free to pass a statute that allows law enforcement to stop and 
ask for documentation of citizenship or alien status. 226 Oklahoma is passing 
laws forbidding the consideration of Sharia law in any judicial decision. 227 
• 
Other states Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana have considered legislation 
to bar collective bargaining rights to either public or private employee 
unions on the grounds that unions represent ''them," not "us": ''[T]he most 
powerful special interest in . America today are the government 
unions .... Some of the money is siphoned into. political union dues, goes 
back into politics and elects people who will vote for more and more and 
more."228 But the militarized rhetoric of ''us" empowers listeners to accept 
the credo that. disagreement begets violence, thus prompting one citizen to 
argue that any legitimate protests that this legislation might spark among 
"them" should be greeted with "live ammunition."229 
224. "My school is considering drug tests .. ~. Certainly, we value our freedom. But if there's one 
thing we've learned ... , it is that our freedom has a price. If that means drug. testing, so be it. 
It's a price rm willing to pay." Student Drug-Testing Coalition, Student Drug-Testing Programs: 
An Overview and Resource Guide 33 (2008). . 
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(Ariz. 2010). 
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V. CAT'S CRADLE230 
Politicians and pundits have become immune to the ethics of war 
rhetoric. The rhetoric itself is violent, and it breeds violence. The forty 
years of the War on Drugs has demonstrated the success of militarized 
rhetoric to move this nation to action. It does not suggest the success of the 
war itself, but it demonstrated the power of the marketing tool. It allows 
• 
pundits and politicians to avoid responsibility by saying: "Everybody does 
it._" The War on Drugs has datnaged the American culture and it has 
damaged its democratic genius, the rule of law. But ultimately, it has made 
acceptable the idea of being at war with each other. 
As the parable of the War on Drugs has taught the people of this 
nation, we will target specific enemies in the cause of an abstraction when 
impelled by metaphorical militarized rhetoric. Those enemies will not be 
protected by our rule of law. As these abstractions become less connected 
to facts and pragmatism, metaphorical rhetoric acquires the tenor of actual 
call to anns. The subtleties of the distinctions even if those distinctions 
-
exist are lost on the crowd that no longer recognizes the moral 
implications of war. Left to its own · devices to preserve itself, the crowd 
will select enemies at random, targeting anybody who is not "us" to 
preserve itself. Gabrielle Giffords was specifically targeted in this Culture 
War. One can hardly argue that her shooting was coincidence or that 
mental instability is an intervening cause. Today's pundits and politicians 
. no longer have the moral sense to even see the connection. Maybe that 
. 
blindness is the most horrifying result of the numbness we suffer from the 
forty-year clrumbeat of the War on Drugs: "Regardless of how you try to 
explain to people it's a 'war on drugs' or a 'war on a product,' people see a 
war as a war on them .... We're not at war with people in this country."231 
During its ill-conceived and badly implemented forty-year life, the 
War on Drugs has made victims of Americans' self-respect, their sense of 
democracy, and their children. As originally marketed, this War would rid 
-the nation's schools of drugs and drug users, thereby helping schools get 
back to what they are designed to do educate children. No one doubts or 
could credibly argue that drug use and schools do not mix. The problems. 
with the War on Drugs were early apparent, making its longevity somewhat 
• 
230. "Perhaps, when we remetnber wars, we should take off our clothes and paint ourselves blue and 
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oratory and shows of flags and well-oiled guns." KURT VONNEGUT, CAT'S CRADLE 254 (Dial 
Press Trade Paperback 1991). Long popular with young adults, Cat's Cradle is among Kurt 
Vonnegut's well-known anti-war novels. 
231. Fieldst supra note 173, at A3 . 
• 
• 
2011] War as· Metaphor 43 
• 
. 
of!! ·mystery. However, our ability to. embrace war as the solution to a 
social policy and to ignore the moral ambiguities caused by such solution 
arose from the casual way in which we accept militarized rhetoric as the 
appropriate frame for the problem. In so accepting that pathos, we allowed 
our goverlllltent to actually engage an enemy who could not fight back and 
to tum their safe haven into a war zone. If we allow our own children to be 
targeted, what stops people from declaring war on Members of Congress? 
• 
